

Deliverable 2.2

Citizen & Authority Learning and Improving Preparedness Plans (CLIPP) Prototype

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Authors: *Ivonne Herrera, Lucia Liste, Evangelia Petridou and Gudveig Gjørund (NSR); Maya Battisti, Raniero Maggini and Michele Mansi (CA); Cristian Airinei (DSU); Sonia Matera and Erica Vannucci (DBL)*

Abstract: This deliverable introduces the CLIPP (Citizen & Authority Learning and Improving Preparedness Plans) prototype. Its core part is the integration of a comparative institutional analysis of preparedness planning frameworks with empirical findings from stakeholder interviews and participatory workshops. These elements form the foundation for the co-creation of the CLIPP procedure. The deliverable is complemented by the CLIPP handbook, which offers practical guidance for implementing the procedure in real-world contexts.



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Authors	Ivonne Herrera (NSR), Lucia Liste (NSR), Evangelia Petridou (NSR), Gudveig Gjøsund (NSR), Maya Battisti (CA), Raniero Maggini (CA), Michele Mansi (CA), Cristian Airinei (DSU), Sonia Matera (DBL), Erica Vannucci (DBL)
Contributors	Mihaela Trandafir (DSU), Iordan Gavrilă (DSU), Jeni-Carla Colev (DSU), Elena Treanță (DSU), Ioana Dincă (DSU), Lucian Buboï (IGSU), Monica Lunde (INN), Anna Benigni (CR), Elena Innocenzi (CR), Katarzyna Cichomska (DBL)
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Table of Contents

Empower-Citizens project overview	8
Executive summary	9
1. Introduction	11
1.1. Purpose and scope of the document	11
1.2. Intended readership	11
1.3. Deliverable structure	11
1.4. Relation with other deliverables	12
2. Analysis of preparedness plans across diverse contexts	13
2.1. Norway: national self-preparedness plans and county preparedness plans	13
2.1.1 Civil preparedness plans in context	13
2.1.2 National level	14
2.1.3 County level	15
2.1.4 Conclusions of the norwegian case study	16
2.2. Italy: municipality preparedness plans	17
2.2.1 Civil preparedness plans in context	17
2.2.2 Municipal level	18
2.2.3 Conclusions of the italian case study	20
2.3. Romania: preparedness plans	20
2.3.1 County level	20
2.3.2 Conclusions of the romanian case study	21
2.4. Conclusions	21
3. Mapping needs, practices and requirements with authorities	23
3.1. Norway: interview results	23
3.1.1 Target interviewees	23
3.1.2 Existing practices	23
3.1.3 Needs	24
3.1.4 Opportunities and challenges	25
3.1.5 Territorial network	26
3.2. Italy: interview results	27
3.2.2 Target interviewees	27
3.2.2 Existing practices	27
3.2.3 Needs	27
3.2.4 Opportunities and challenges	28
3.2.5 Territorial network	28
3.3. Romania: interview results	29
3.3.1 Target interviewees	29
3.3.2 Existing practices	29
3.3.3 Needs	30
3.3.4 Opportunities and challenges	30
3.3.5 Territorial network	31
3.4. Interviews comparative analysis	31

3.5. Conclusions	35
4. CLIPP procedure workshops	36
4.1. Initial version of the CLIPP procedure	36
4.2. Workshop planning	37
4.3. Summary of workshop results	38
4.4. Conclusions: main recommendations to update CLIPP	41
5. Conclusions	43
References	45
Appendix A: framework to analyse preparedness plans	47
Appendix B: interview guide	50
Appendix C: workshop material	53
Appendix D: results of the workshop in Norway	55
Appendix E: results of the workshop in Italy	65

List of Tables

Table 1: Overview of norwegian national plan	14
Table 2: Overview of norwegian regional plan	15
Table 3: Overview of italian municipal plan	18
Table 4: Overview of romanian regional plan	20
Table 5. Feedback gathered on the CLIPP deriving from the Norwegian and Italian workshops	38

List of Figures

Figure 1. The CLIPP procedure and its five steps (version 1, 2025)	36
Figure 2. CLIPP activity summary by step used in the workshops	38

List of Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
CERIS	Community for European Research and Innovation for Security
CLIPP	Citizen & Authority Learning and Improving Preparedness Plans
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
EC	European Commission
NKS	Norwegian Women's Public Health Association
NoCoU	Norway Community of Users
UCPKN	European Union Civil Protection Knowledge Network
UCPM	Union Civil Protection Mechanism

EMPOWER-CITIZENS PROJECT OVERVIEW

The Empower-Citizens project develops and tests a solution for **using feedback and lessons learnt, acquired by citizens during disasters, exercises and simulations in preparedness plans**. Citizens' first-hand experience, tacit knowledge and skills gained during these events are significant and offer feedback and knowledge that are complementary to official professional actors, representing an important asset for the management of future events. The project will:

- integrate citizens' experiences into the existing process of drafting and revising preparedness plans
- actively involve the public in preparedness activities.

It builds on past EU and national projects to review, adapt and integrate existing practices for **eliciting, selecting, filtering and aggregating experience and feedback from citizens, communities and civil society organisations**. These outputs are merged in a procedure for revising and improving preparedness plans called "**Citizen & Authority Learning and Improving Preparedness Plans**" (**CLIPP**), including practical guidelines and support tools that will help authorities apply this approach in their local contexts. The CLIPP procedure will be evaluated in the revision of **two real preparedness plans in Castelraimondo, Italy and Innlandet County, Norway**, with citizen-learned lessons at their core, and will subsequently be **scaled up for a wider application at a European level**.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview

This deliverable presents the Citizen & Authority Learning and Improving Preparedness Plans (CLIPP) prototype. This is a systematic procedure for integrating citizen feedback and experiential knowledge into the development and revision of emergency preparedness plans across Europe. Co-developed through collaborative and participatory research activities involving authorities and NGOs with links to citizens in Norway, Italy and Romania, CLIPP transforms citizens from passive information recipients into active co-producers of preparedness strategies.

Key findings impacting CLIPP development

Legal and institutional landscape: Analysis of preparedness plans across three countries reveals divergent levels of citizen participation formalisation. Norway demonstrates strong corporatist traditions with structured public consultation at national levels but limited systematic engagement. Italy mandates citizen participation rhetorically but lacks practical mechanisms for integration. Romania operates within a robust institutional framework but engages citizens indirectly through educational programmes rather than truly participatory planning processes.

Critical knowledge gap: Interviews with authorities and stakeholders across all three countries confirm that citizens possess significant, experience-based knowledge, including information about local resources, alternative routes during emergencies, vulnerable neighbours requiring support and hidden competencies that formal processes systematically overlook. This knowledge remains largely undocumented and inaccessible during preparedness planning.

Implementation barriers: Resource constraints (both in terms of human resources and other monetary resources), person-dependent processes, the need to manage volunteer resources better and uneven geographic reach (stronger in rural areas with cohesive social networks) present challenges to the scaling up of citizen engagement across diverse contexts.

Opportunities: Public servants and officials of civil society organisations (CSOs) are aware of knowledge residing with ordinary citizens, and given compatibility with existing bureaucratic methods and practices, there remain possibilities for its integration in preparedness plans.

Co-development and recommendations

Workshops in Norway and Italy validated CLIPP's conceptual robustness and practical utility. Participants emphasised the need for:

- simplified, accessible language and modular flexibility
- minimum viable routines tailored to small municipalities
- practical methods for systematic resident input (especially youth engagement)
- strengthened feedback and recognition of formal and informal practices
- regular institutional dialogue instances (seasonal planning, evaluation and coordination cycles)

The revised CLIPP procedure

The revised version of CLIPP integrates insight and lessons from analyses of preparedness plans, interviews and workshops. In short, it comprises five sequential steps:

1. Understanding the local context, formal and informal resources, and stakeholders to establish foundations for participation.
2. Fostering dialogue with citizens to collect lived experiences and practical lessons related to crisis management.
3. Organising information collaboratively to categorise and validate feedback, bridging expert and local knowledge.
4. Revising preparedness plans based on integrated knowledge from preceding steps.
5. Sharing lessons learned with citizens to ensure transparency and motivate sustained participation.

Implications for future work

CLIPP represents a shift from top-down and one-way communication towards more collaborative and participatory approaches to preparedness. By institutionalising systematic integration of citizen knowledge, the procedure enhances plan relevance, builds community trust, reduces person-dependence and strengthens societal resilience, considering both formal and informal networks and citizens as important contributors to emergency response. Implementation requires modest reallocation of preparedness resources, adoption of accessible communication tools and a commitment to treating citizens as knowledge experts bringing additional adaptive capacities rather than passive audiences.

The procedure will be tested in Italy (Castelraimondo) and Norway (Innlandet County), and further work will be performed to scale up for wider European application with contextual adaptation. To advance operationalisation of CLIPP, further work requires its validation in diverse contexts through partnerships between authorities, CSOs and researchers, to advance a tool that consolidates knowledge on societal resilience and operational experience.

Acknowledgements

This report is the result of excellent cooperation between authorities, civil society organisations with links to citizens, and researchers, in a joint effort to improve preparedness activities. We thank all the participants for their openness, experience and knowledge sharing. We hope this work will serve as inspiration to other municipalities in operationalising the CLIPP procedure and approaches to strengthen concrete preparedness measures.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE DOCUMENT

This deliverable introduces the CLIPP (Citizen & Authority Learning and Improving Preparedness Plans) prototype. Its core part is the integration of a comparative institutional analysis of preparedness planning frameworks with empirical findings from stakeholder interviews and participatory workshops, forming the basis of the co-creation of the CLIPP procedure. This document is accompanied by the CLIPP handbook, which provides practical guidance for implementing the procedure in real-world settings. Videos related to this work are available at: <https://www.youtube.com/@Empower-Citizens>¹.

Limitations: The findings and lessons learned are based on a limited set of document analysis, interviews and workshops. Further implementation of interviews and workshops is needed to generalize the findings presented in this report.

1.2. INTENDED READERSHIP

This document is intended for practitioners, policymakers and organisations interested in citizen participation in emergency preparedness and crisis management. It is particularly relevant for authorities at all levels of governance involved in designing, updating or implementing preparedness plans, as it offers practical guidance on how to collect, assess and integrate citizens' feedback and lived experiences from disasters, exercises and simulations.

The document is also aimed at municipalities with limited resources, providing adaptable and scalable approaches to participatory preparedness. In addition, it may be useful for civil society organisations, community groups and volunteer networks seeking to strengthen participatory approaches in their preparedness and response activities, as well as for researchers and academic institutions looking for inspiration and practical insights on how citizen knowledge can be meaningfully integrated into disaster preparedness and crisis management.

1.3. DELIVERABLE STRUCTURE

The document is structured into the following sections:

- Chapter 2 provides an overview over the analysis of preparedness plans across the three national contexts involved in the project.
- Chapter 3 presents the results from interviews, mapping needs, practices and requirements across authorities.
- Chapter 4 introduces the initial CLIPP procedure, details on the workshop planning, workshop results and recommendations to improve the CLIPP procedure.

¹ The main project video will be updated to reflect the second version of the CLIPP procedure before its application in the project's test cases.

- Chapter 5 presents an overview of improvements to the CLIPP procedure, informed by insights from the previous chapters.

The annexes supporting the implementation of the work include a template for the analysis of preparedness plans and for reporting on this analysis; an interview template for reporting on the analysis of needs, barriers and opportunities; and a template for workshop implementation, including a facilitator script. All templates are available in English, Italian, Norwegian and Romanian.

Based on the analyses of preparedness plans, interviews and workshop results conducted in Italy and Norway, a separate document presents the CLIPP Procedure. This document is delivered as a practical guide, outlining the steps of the CLIPP procedure and providing guidance on how to implement each step.

1.4. RELATION WITH OTHER DELIVERABLES

The deliverable D2.1 provides a selection of practical methods to operationalize the CLIPP procedure and work reported in deliverable D2.2

The deliverable D2.2 provides information for:

- Deliverables 3.1 and 3.2: The deliverable D2.2 provides the CLIPP procedure guide to be evaluated in the test cases.
- Deliverable 4.1 and 4.2: Serving as a baseline for calibration and scale-up, the deliverable D2.2 documents context sensitive aspects that have been considered in developing a practical tool relevant for authorities from different countries.

2. ANALYSIS OF PREPAREDNESS PLANS ACROSS DIVERSE CONTEXTS

This section constitutes a systematic, comparative analysis of the legal and institutional arrangements that govern the drafting and implementation of preparedness plans in Norway, Italy and Romania. The analytical framework used in this section can be found in Appendix A.

2.1. NORWAY: NATIONAL SELF-PREPAREDNESS PLANS AND COUNTY PREPAREDNESS PLANS

This section presents a review of the Norwegian broad legislative context, followed by the analysis of a national and a regional preparedness plan.

2.1.1 CIVIL PREPAREDNESS PLANS IN CONTEXT

Norway is a unitary state, where the subnational level of governance enjoys considerable autonomy. Municipalities must comply with broad national mandates, though there is substantial discretion in the implementation of these mandates.

Stakeholders, both governmental and non-governmental, are officially part of the policymaking process. At the preparation stage of bills and regulations, specifically on civil protection, health preparedness and infection control, public consultation (*høring*) is mandated by law. Stakeholders include national agencies, counties, municipalities, NGOs, interest organisations, experts, academics and anyone who might be affected by the new legislation. This is also the case for national strategies, including white papers (see e.g., Government of Norway, 2025).

Preparedness plans at the municipal level have a rather operative character and do not require public consultation. However, municipalities are legally bound to prepare and update a *holistic risk and vulnerability analysis* and an *overarching preparedness plan*. According to the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) guidelines, these are required to involve public, private and voluntary actors in their plans, though this involvement is not formalised. Similarly, rescue service organisation plans and health preparedness plans at the municipal level do not mandate formal public input. Instead, they rely on councils, coordination forums and CSOs for input.

The following **core legislation and regulations** govern preparedness at the subnational level in Norway:

- The [Civil Protection Act \(2010\)](#) assigns municipalities a coordinating mandate in civil protection and emergency preparedness, and establishes the municipal duty of preparedness. The law is built on the principle of cooperation (*samvirkeprinsippet*) and explicitly allows for collaboration with private and voluntary actors (*Lov om sivil beskyttelse og beredskap*, LOV-2010-06-25-45. §§ 12–15),
- The [Regulation on Municipal Emergency Preparedness Duty \(2011\)](#) requires municipalities to carry out holistic risk and vulnerability (ROS) analyses, overarching emergency preparedness plans, training, exercises and crisis communication. DSB's

(Directorate for Civil Protection) guidelines emphasise that this must be done in collaboration with public, private and voluntary actors (*Forskrift om kommunal beredskapsplikt*, Forskrift 2011-08-22-894).

- The [Health Preparedness Act \(2000\)](#) and the [Public Health Act §31](#) require preparedness plans for health and care services and environmental health protection, which must be harmonised with other municipal plans. This is important for citizen-oriented information, volunteer contributions and mobilisation of resources during crises (*Lov om helsemessig og sosial beredskap*, LOV-2000-06-23-56; and *Lov om folkehelsearbeid*, LOV-2011-06-24-29).
- The [Infection Control Act](#) emphasises that infection control measures must primarily be based on voluntary participation, with municipalities as the local responsible authority (*Lov om vern mot smittsomme sykdommer*, LOV-1994-08-05-55. Emphasis on voluntary participation (§1-5)).

The activities of the **rescue services and volunteers** are governed by [Instruction/organisational plan for the rescue service](#) (Royal Decree), which establishes cooperation, training and coordination among the police, emergency services and voluntary organisations (*Organisasjonsplan for redningstjenesten*, LOV-1995-08-04-53-§27). The Joint Rescue Coordination Centres (HRS) and Local Rescue Centres (LRS) are required to conduct regular exercises to strengthen cooperation (<https://www.hovedredningsentralen.no/>). The **Rescue Service Handbook** describes the rescue and emergency preparedness councils in each police district, which bring together public agencies, private actors and CSOs as arenas for coordination before and during extraordinary events (Government of Norway 2024). Importantly, the Office of the Auditor General's recent assessment (May 2025) highlights the need for clearer practical follow-up and specification of civilian roles, which is particularly relevant when specifying the inclusion of citizens and volunteers (Office of the Auditor General of Norway 2025).

2.1.2 NATIONAL LEVEL

Table 1: Overview of norwegian national plan

Level	National
Issuing authority	Directorate of Civil Protection (DSB)
Plan title	How You Can Play Your Part in Norway's Emergency Preparedness. Advice on Emergency Preparedness.
Year	2025
Hazard type	A disruption in electricity supply, water supply, sewage systems, payment systems, the Internet, mobile telephone service and food supply chains
Duration	One week, the self-preparedness plan was significantly updated in 2025.

This document is a set of guidelines addressed to every Norwegian resident with steps on how to prepare for being self-sustained for a week in the event of a crisis. The **legal basis** of this communication pamphlet, which is [available online](#) at the website of the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), is the white paper on Total Preparedness, Meld. St. 9 (Government of Norway, 2025), a recommendation by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, with the core message that strengthening societal resilience requires a wide range of measures, including self preparedness. DSB gathers data through annual campaigns, including the “self-preparedness week” (week 44) and surveys to assess the levels of public preparedness. DSB takes an **all hazards and all risks approach**, recommending stocking a wide array of supplies to have available in the event of disruptions ranging from extreme weather events to war, and everything in between. The plan explicitly names a variety of **stakeholders**, including household members, neighbours, family and friends, a “preparedness buddy”, voluntary organisations and household associations. There is a high level of awareness among Norwegians regarding preparedness: the latest survey, published in February 2025, shows that more than 4 out of 5 agree that households must be prepared to fend for themselves without help from the authorities for a week, while almost 7 out of 10 believe that the individual has a great or very high responsibility for dealing with the consequences of crises. Finally, the proportion of the population who state that they store drinking water has increased from 21 per cent in 2017 to 47 per cent in 2024 (Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection 2025).

The **preparedness activities** covered in this document range the entire gamut of *Assess, Plan, Resource, Train & Exercise, Communicate & Engage, Review & Improve*, with explicit guidelines on how to actively and jointly prepare for an extraordinary event as an individual and a member of the community. **Local knowledge** is foregrounded and **integrated** with calls to be actively connected to friends and neighbours. The document is **available** in 30 languages, with tailored guidelines for children and young people.

2.1.3 COUNTY LEVEL

Table 2: Overview of norwegian regional plan

Level	Regional
Issuing authority	Innlandet
Plan title	Preparedness Plan for the County Governor’s Office
Year	2023
Hazard type	All hazard approach, regions and municipalities are often updated annually

The plan **takes an all-hazards** approach. It refers to **FylkesROS (Regional Risk and Vulnerability Analysis)** as the foundation for preparedness planning. The primary focus of the plan is internal crisis management within the County Governor’s office (Statsforvalteren i Innlandet). It details roles, responsibilities, staff structure, alert systems, and communication routines. It is administrative in character, and inter-agency oriented. As a consequence, the plan

does not include a summary of the most relevant risks of the past decade, trends analyses, linkages to climate change, demographic shifts or social vulnerabilities. The hazard profile is outsourced to another document (FylkesROS), not integrated here (Innlandet County Municipality 2023). The plan maps **institutional stakeholders**, including the County Governor, the police, municipalities, DSB, county emergency council. CSOs are, however, **not systematically mapped**.

The plan mentions that **evaluations from exercises and incidents** are considered in the process of updating future plans, but does not provide concrete historical learning examples. The **preparedness activities** are covered as follows:

- **Assess** - The document refers to FylkesROS (regional risk and vulnerability analysis) as the basis for preparedness. Citizens are not part of the assessment process.
- **Plan** - The plan is procedural and organisational. It focuses on how the County Governor's office operates internally. There is no evidence of participatory planning or local consultation.
- **Resource** - Resource planning is focused on internal staff mobilisation (roles, duty systems, liaison). It mentions access to external resources through Fylkesberedskapsrådet. There is no mapping of volunteer resources, community capacity or citizen contributions.
- **Train and Exercise** - There is a strong emphasis on annual training and exercises, but only for staff and institutions. Exercises concern agency coordination, not community drills or public education. Citizens are not included in training activities.
- **Communicate and Engage** - The citizens are information recipients, and not engaged in two-way communication or planning. There is no provision for engagement mechanisms.
- **Review and Improve** - Evaluation routines are in place (annual revisions, after-action reviews of exercises/incidents). Improvement is agency-driven (by DSB methodology and by preparedness unit). There is no provision for citizen input in the review processes.

2.1.4 CONCLUSIONS OF THE NORWEGIAN CASE STUDY

There is a strong corporatist tradition in Norway – though, like in all Nordic countries, it is on the decline (see Selle and Østerud, 2006) – which means that public input is formalised at the national level. In the case of civil preparedness, municipalities are encouraged to involve voluntary actors in risk and vulnerability analyses, planning, training and crisis communication. This is required in the regulation and emphasised in DSB's guidelines. Voluntary organisations have a **formalised role** in the rescue service and take part in planning, councils and exercises together with emergency agencies and the rescue coordination centres. Citizens participate especially in **infection control** (through voluntary compliance with measures and informed cooperation) and via **local emergency councils** and municipal crisis communication.

At the subnational level specifically, the analysed plan has a narrow, administrative legal framing. It is rooted in formal state instructions, leaving little mandate for direct citizen involvement. Activities are internally comprehensive but exclude citizen participation. The plan does not explicitly highlight any type of citizen knowledge. Citizens are framed as the audience, i.e., receptors of information and subjects of municipal preparedness, rather than sources of knowledge or evidence. The plan does not demonstrate any direct mechanisms for citizen involvement in assessment, planning, training or evaluation.

2.2. ITALY: MUNICIPALITY PREPAREDNESS PLANS

In this section, we review the Italian broad legislative context, followed by the analysis of a municipal preparedness plan.

2.2.1 CIVIL PREPAREDNESS PLANS IN CONTEXT

Italy is a unitary state with a decentralised public administration. The Italian emergency management system, known as the National Civil Protection Service, is a multi-level, integrated system based on the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that response is initiated at the lowest possible level of governance.

When an extraordinary event happens, the municipal authorities immediately report them to the Prefecture and the Headquarters of Fire and Rescue Services, as well as to the relevant provincial and regional bodies. When the emergency affects an area larger than the municipal territory, or when access to resources must be scaled up, the Regional Functional Centre will activate. This is governed by regional legislation, such as the [Marche Regional Council Resolution N. 148/2018](#) (Regional Council of the Region of Marche, 2018).

The following **core legislation and regulations** govern preparedness at the national and subnational levels:

National Level

- [Legislative Decree 1/2018 “Civil Protection Code”](#) (Government of Italy, 2018): According to the article n.18 of the “Codice della Protezione Civile”: “... the participation of citizens, individually or in association, is ensured in the process of developing civil protection planning, in accordance with the forms and method identified in the directive referred to paragraph 4”. This directive, “Guidelines for the preparation of the civil protection plans”, which was issued in April 2021, regulates the various levels of planning and ensures the participation of organised civil protection volunteers.
- [Law 365/2000 “Urgent measures for areas at very high hydrogeological risk and in the field of civil protection, as well as for areas of the Calabria region damaged by hydrogeological disasters in September and October 2000”](#) (Government of Italy, 2000): This legislation mandates the provision of adequate information for, and communication of, emergency plans to the relevant populations. This includes measures to safeguard the safety of the population, such as early warning systems and evacuation in flood-prone areas.

Regional Level

The implementation of the national law is the responsibility of the regions based on their own needs and legislative architecture provided that it does not contradict national legislation. The following legislations are relevant for the project Test Case:

- [Regional Law 32/2001 of Marche Region “Regional system of Civil Protection”](#) (Regional Council of the Region of Marche, 2001): In line with national law, it assigns tasks

and functions to local authorities and relevant public structures. Article n.16 emphasises how the Region must encourage participation of the Civil Protection Organisation in the preparation and implementation of programmes and plans. It also formulates guidelines regarding the activities of civil protection volunteers at the provincial, municipal and intermunicipal levels.

- [Resolution of Regional executive 765/2019 of Marche Region “Guidelines for preparing the municipal civil protection emergency plan”](#) (Regional Council of the Region of Marche, 2019): This resolution regulates the forms of communication to the population. It also regulates “Regional guidelines for the effective inclusion of persons with disabilities in municipal emergency planning activities”, emphasising the importance of including persons with disabilities in emergency planning and management activities.

2.2.2 MUNICIPAL LEVEL

Table 3: Overview of Italian municipal plan

Level	Municipal
Issuing authority	Comune di Castelraimondo
Plan title	Municipal Civil Protection Plan for Safeguarding the Safety of the Population Living in At-Risk Areas
Year	2020
Hazard type	Hydrogeological risk, earthquake, water and air pollution and large forest fires
Duration	The current plan does not specify the duration. The recent guidelines issued by the Marche Region (Guidelines for the Preparation of Municipal Civil Protection Plans, 2025) stipulate that Municipal Civil Protection Plans must be continuously updated with regard to dynamic data (contacts, resources) and periodically reviewed, at least every three years, with regard to key aspects such as risk scenarios, intervention models and organisation. This follows specific regional guidelines and national regulations, to keep the plan up to date with changing conditions in the territory and needs, as also established by the new regional laws.

[Municipal Civil Protection Plan for Safeguarding the Safety of the Population Living in At-Risk Areas \(Municipality of Castelraimondo, 2008\)](#).

This municipal plan has a specific **hazard profile**, describing the most relevant hazards and risks for the municipality, including hydrogeological risk, earthquakes, water and air contamination and large wildfires. The plan **maps relevant stakeholders**, including inhabitants, households, people with disabilities, older people, school-aged children and non-resident populations, for the purpose of ensuring appropriate evacuation routines. The mapping of populations at risk is based on the Social Services Office according to [DGR 765/2019](#) (Regional Council of the Region of Marche,

2019). The plan maps institutional stakeholders including the *Carabinieri* (national gendarmerie of Italy), the traffic police, the municipal police, the Fire and Rescue Services, the Mayor, the Prefect, Service Offices (e.g., ASUR - Marche Regional Health Authority, ARPAM - Regional Agency for Environmental Protection of the Marche Region), the President of the regional council and the President of the Province. Further, it includes a list of voluntary civil protection organisations to provide an overview of resources in terms of personnel, equipment and professional skills. This is done in order to coordinate the activities of volunteers in harmony with other operational structures. Finally, there is a list of Citizens Band (CB) radio clubs. Having been drafted back in 2020, the plan does not reference any recent event, but rather uses the two landslides (Fonte Canale and Carsignano 2013) and the 2016 earthquake as anchor events. The Plan focuses primarily on emergency management and the mobilisation of emergency response structures (particularly public ones). There are currently no guidelines for local planning and related participation processes.

The **preparedness activities** are covered as follows:

- **Assess** - Which institution is responsible for monitoring depends on the type of risk. The institutions include Fire and Rescue Services, Local Health Authorities, Regional Environmental Protection Agency, *Forestry Carabinieri* (Carabinieri Command for Forest Protection), Municipal Civil Protection Groups and others. Citizens are not part of the assessment process.
- **Plan** - The Civil Protection Plan is a set of operational procedures and planned actions as part of emergency response. There are no provisions for a participatory process, but communication to the public is mandated.
- **Resource** - The resources allocated to the Civil Protection Structure are: personnel, equipment and professional skills to be activated. Local CB-radio clubs are specifically mentioned to ensure communication in emergencies. Other associations (although not specifically mentioned) are also indicated in the preparedness phase for operational actions in their area of competence.
- **Train and Exercise** - The Castelraimondo's Civil Protection Plan mentions periodic civil protection exercises aimed at ensuring that the population is aware of the plan. However, the methods and timing of these exercises are not specified. Refresher courses are planned for members of CSOs. Schools also participate in prevention and information programmes.
- **Communicate and Engage** - The citizen is cast as the recipient of information, not involved in two-way communication or planning. The Civil Protection Plan regulates the provision of information to the population, namely what people must do during and after an emergency and the dissemination of alerts. During peacetime, the administration periodically carries out dissemination activities through public events, pamphlets and the like.
- **Review and Improve** - The plan has to be reviewed periodically to account for different risks and changes in the municipality, but there does not appear to be any provision for citizen involvement. The plan does not explicitly mention barriers or enabling factors.

2.2.3 CONCLUSIONS OF THE ITALIAN CASE STUDY

Based on the Castelraimondo Civil Protection Plan, emergency planning and management follow a top-down approach with little scope for citizen involvement (with the exception of members of CSOs), which acts as a **barrier** for citizen participation. However, the plan includes **opportunities** to involve citizens' knowledge. Section B.4 could be the starting point for encouraging more citizen involvement in the planning process. Furthermore, the involvement of vulnerable people, based on Regional Council Decision [765/2019](#) (Regional Council of the Regional of Marche, 2018), could be an important basis for improving the effectiveness of the plan.

2.3. ROMANIA: PREPAREDNESS PLANS

Romania is a unitary state with a centralised system (MAI/DSU/IGSU), allocating responsibilities to the county (CJSU/ISU) and local (CLSU/SVSU) levels. Annual planning and coordination are carried out by ISU Galați, the Prefecture and local CLSUs, under the supervision of the County Committee for Emergency Situations (CJSU).

2.3.1 COUNTY LEVEL

Table 4: Overview of romanian regional plan

Level	Regional (County)
Issuing authority	County Inspectorate for Emergency Situations “General Eremia Grigorescu” – endorsed; County Prefect – approved (President of CJSU).
Plan title	Emergency Preparedness Plan
Year	2025
Hazard type	All-hazards approach (floods, landslides, fires, other specific risks).
Duration	Annual.
Notes	Structured according to IGSU Order 2/IG/2019; includes general/specific objectives, organisation, exercises, education, record & evaluation, logistics.

The plan has a specific **hazard profile**. Major floods (2013 and 2024) are repeatedly mentioned, while other specific risks are addressed in an all-hazards approach, though without multi-annual trend analyses.

The plan **maps** ISU, CJSU, CLSU, public institutions, economic actors and educational institutions, but lacks mapping of NGOs, CSOs or groups at risk. **Historical events** shaping preparedness are referenced, and specifically local floods in 2013 and 2024, relevant for exercise calibration, communication and education. **Communication channels** include Facebook, institutional

websites, local posters and online dissemination practices. There exists periodic information after the plan is approved, though **without structured public feedback loops**. Preparedness culture and learning, training and awareness actions are mainly institutional, focusing on staff and volunteers. There is no structured evaluation of citizen learning or behavioural change after exercises.

ISU Galați uses digital alert systems (RO-ALERT) and social media for communication, but no interactive platform exists for two-way engagement or citizen input (e.g., self-reporting of risks or preparedness). Romanian counties share a centralised preparedness structure with limited mechanisms for public consultation, consistent with the framework observed in Galați.

Preparedness activities are covered as follows:

- **Assess** - The plan assesses through risk inventories and zone delimitation, though no citizen involvement is reported in the survey. In terms of **planning**, there are provisions for coordination among ISU, the Prefecture and CLSU.
- **Resource** - Resources concern the SVSU structure and a 72-hour kit recommended for household-level preparedness.
- **Train and Exercise** - Exercises are regularly organised, with an opportunity to expand with community participation and lessons from the 2013 and 2024 floods.
- **Communicate and Engage** - Communication takes place through Facebook, websites and posters, but remains one-way with limited engagement from citizens.
- **Review and Improve** - Internal revisions and evaluations are regularly conducted, but there is no systematic process for integrating citizen feedback.

While there is preventive education in schools, and SVSU volunteers are recognised, there is no evidence of participatory activities from citizens. Anecdotally — based on the experience of the project country team — this pattern is consistent with findings from other Romanian counties, where citizen engagement mostly occurs through preventive education and volunteering rather than structured participation in planning.

2.3.2 CONCLUSIONS OF THE ROMANIAN CASE STUDY

The regional plan contains a hazard profile based on historical emergencies. There exists a clear legal framework, the warning systems are modernised, and there are established SVSU/SPSU, preventive education and regular exercises. However, the plan is characterised by one-way communication towards the citizens and there are no formal mechanisms to collect and validate citizen knowledge. The plan is institutional in focus, lacking a mapping of NGOs and groups at risk, as well as public feedback in after actions reviews (AARs).

2.4. CONCLUSIONS

The comparative analysis of preparedness plans across Norway, Italy and Romania reveals both shared commitments and notable divergences in how these three European countries approach civil protection and citizen involvement in preparedness. All three countries operate within multi-level governance frameworks that distribute preparedness responsibilities across national,

regional and local administrative levels, and each case demonstrates a commitment to an all-hazards approach that addresses diverse threats, ranging from hydrogeological risks and earthquakes to infrastructure disruptions and wildfires. Furthermore, each country has established legal mandates requiring preparedness planning and periodic review, with clear institutional stakeholder mapping and coordination structures. Communication to citizens is universally recognised as essential, with provisions for public information through pamphlets, websites, social media and alert systems. Voluntary organisations and civil protection associations play a recognised role in all three cases, particularly in rescue operations, exercises and local-level response activities.

The differences among the countries, however, are substantial and relate primarily to the degree and formalisation of citizen participation in preparedness planning processes. Norway stands out for its strong corporatist tradition and formalised public consultation mechanisms at the national level, coupled with explicit guidelines from the Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) encouraging collaboration with public, private and voluntary actors at all stages of preparedness, from risk assessment to training and review. The Norwegian national plan directly addresses households as active agents and emphasises local knowledge, community networks and tailored multilingual communication. However, there is no systematic citizen involvement in preparedness at the subnational level. Citizens are cast as recipients of information rather than as participants or sources of knowledge. In Italy, while national law stipulates that citizen participation should be ensured in planning, the practical implementation at the municipal level (as evidenced by the Castelraimondo case) shows limited mechanisms for genuine engagement beyond civil protection volunteers. Similarly, in Romania, despite modernised warning systems and preventive education in schools, preparedness planning remains institutionally focused, with one-way communication and no systematic processes for integrating citizen feedback or mapping vulnerable populations and civil society organisations. These patterns suggest that while the legal and rhetorical commitment to citizen engagement exists across all three countries, the operationalisation of participatory mechanisms, which would transform citizens from passive audiences into active contributors to preparedness knowledge, remains underdeveloped (though in different degrees) in all three cases.

3. MAPPING NEEDS, PRACTICES AND REQUIREMENTS WITH AUTHORITIES

In addition to an analysis of the preparedness plans, interviews with key stakeholders in the public sector and civil society were conducted in the context of the project. The purpose of the interviews was to capture the perspectives of these stakeholders in terms of existing practices, opportunities, challenges, local networks and more broadly their perceptions on citizen participation in preparedness plans, with the aim of improving the CLIPP procedure. To ensure comparability, the same interview guide (developed in Task 2.1) was used for interviews in all three countries, appended in Appendix B.

3.1. NORWAY: INTERVIEW RESULTS

3.1.1 TARGET INTERVIEWEES

This section summarises results from three interviews conducted with the administrations from Innlandet County and two municipalities (Gausdal and Nordre Land). Target interviewees are persons directly involved in the preparation of preparedness plans at the municipality level and in the analysis of events at the county level.

3.1.2 EXISTING PRACTICES

At the county level (Innlandet/Statsforvalteren), citizen perspectives are brought in indirectly through municipalities and organised actors (civil society organisations), while the county focuses on coordination, guidance, supervision and evaluation. Citizen knowledge reaches the county chiefly via representation. As one interviewee described, residents are present via the municipality and the council members, and through civil society inside the County Emergency Preparedness Council.

A notable operational device is the county's **Resource Bank**, which serves to mobilise resources when municipalities face shortages. On the ground, much of what works is tacit and local:

“All municipalities - regardless of how good their documentation is - handle things intuitively... because municipalities in Norway are rooted in local communities.”

During Hans, spontaneous mobilisation illustrated this:

“People went on their own to the town hall to fill sandbags... Many were out with excavators that day.”

The county recognises both the usefulness and the limits of such improvisation, including potential health and safety risks.

The interviews illustrate that there is **no simple correlation between good formal plans and real-world performance**. Some municipalities excel at documentation (e.g., updated ROS, neat

plans) yet feel less confident operationally when conditions deviate from assumptions. Others keep lean paperwork but are **highly effective in action, largely because repeated exposure to floods, slides and compound events has built tacit routines, trusted relationships and speed**. Operational effectiveness depends on tacit local knowledge, trusted relationships and improvisation, as formal plans alone do not ensure successful real-world performance.

Both municipalities, Nordre Land and Gausdal, have formal preparedness plans and risk analysis (ROS), complemented by strong informal networks and local knowledge. The role of preparedness lead is about 7-30 per cent of full-time positions, assuming a flexible approach to address crisis management activities.

“When something happens, of course, I must act - that’s part of the job. Public meetings, school lessons, participating in Preparedness Week - those are not formal duties. But they’re fun and meaningful. You always find time for what you enjoy.”

Creative outreach uses cultural events for communication, information screens at the town hall and municipal Facebook groups. On informal cooperation, municipalities rely on “prepared capacity” (e.g., pre-filled sandbags, machinery located at strategic places) and pre-existing relations with local associations and contractors. CSOs like the local Red Cross and Norwegian Women’s Public Health Association are integrated as standing partners, and CB radio clubs are written into plans for communication redundancy.

The new national requirements to plan for war are reshaping local practices and expectations. Continuity planning has tightened considerably, the work force has been reduced forcing hard prioritisation. These shifts also require communication with citizens, to align expectations about what the municipality can and cannot deliver during crises:

“It’s clear that once we make these plans, citizens must be informed about them—so they know what to expect from the municipality. Even if war doesn’t reach Norway, we’ll receive patients from nearby hospitals we must handle. So people must expect less assistance. That expectation gap must be communicated.”

3.1.3 NEEDS

At the county level, the need for citizen involvement is appreciated in areas such as continuity planning under low staffing, establishing information hubs and servicing as local resources for inventories. Local resource inventories are important complemented with informal relationships:

“In many cases it’s ‘who knows whom’... That’s what makes it effective.”

Fostering self-preparedness within the population is a key objective, as communities capable of managing independently can reduce pressure on formal systems. Municipalities recognise the value of citizen knowledge and experience. A more systematic integration of information and involvement of residents can enhance situational understanding and response capacity.

Residents possess detailed, **experience-based knowledge of local vulnerabilities and routes that official maps often overlook**. They know which hamlets are prone to isolation when bridges or fords fail, and where **alternative forest or terrain roads remain passable** even in heavy snow

or floods. During Storm Hans, for example, several such detours were identified by locals, allowing food and medicine deliveries to continue despite washed-out roads. Similarly, residents' knowledge of **neighbours dependent on medical devices**, such as oxygen concentrators or home dialysis, could be crucial for prioritising generator allocation and welfare checks during prolonged outages.

Another key area involves mapping “hidden competences” among residents, people whose skills could prove vital in a crisis. These informal networks of competence could be registered and integrated into contingency planning without heavy bureaucracy.

“We’ll also need to bring in unaffiliated residents—retired nurses, auxiliary nurses, Red Cross veterans. Basically, all hands on deck.”

One of the informants also highlights local communication solutions as a valuable citizen-driven resource. A notable example is the use of hunting radios as a backup network:

“If the mobiles go down, the hunting radio comes up.”

Documenting this system formally, identifying CB radio operators, agreeing on frequencies and establishing simple contact protocols, would help ensure continuity if digital channels fail.

So far, citizen input has primarily entered preparedness work through open meetings and Preparedness Week activities, where local feedback sometimes finds its way into sector plans. To make this contribution more visible and lasting, one of the informants suggests formalising such interactions, e.g., through annual citizen workshops.

“They don’t necessarily see themselves as having “preparedness expertise,” but they do have thoughts about how a situation would affect them—and not just them, but their neighbourhood, maybe the whole village. If we could strengthen the preparedness position or resources, that’s one of the things I’d prioritise: more public meetings, inviting myself to residents’ association meetings, and so on—to talk about preparedness. For example: how can we reach you—and you reach us—when the mobile network is down?”

3.1.4 OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

A central opportunity is Norway’s high levels of **trust and voluntary compliance**, which underpin strong commitment to preparedness. As one informant noted during the pandemic:

“People actually do what we ask without there being a legal basis.”

Another opportunity lies in the existing **culture of volunteering** ‘muscle’, developed through large events (Birken, festivals). The collective volunteer spirit, *dugnadsånd*, is deeply embedded in the Norwegian tradition and clearly visible during Hans storm. This **capacity for rapid, collective response**, seen in sandbagging and mountain rescue, remains a cornerstone of local resilience. At the municipality level, preparedness work rests on a strong base of rural social capital and practical local knowledge, yet it operates under tight resource constraints and institutional fragility. One of the informants highlights both opportunities to build on existing strengths and challenges that risk undermining resilience if not addressed.

Equally valuable is the fine-grained **local know-how** embedded in the Norwegian communities. Residents collectively know which farmer has a clean water tank and who owns a machine. Local cafés, sports clubs, farmers' associations and cultural events already act as social nodes for information sharing. These spaces have proven crucial during earlier crises.

Finally, community strengths - **social cohesion, flexible networks, familiarity** - stem from its **rural character**. However, these features are harder to replicate in larger, more anonymous urban settings where neighbourhood ties are weaker and time pressures are higher.

Key challenges mirror these strengths: Much **capacity is undocumented and person-dependent**. **Several challenges converge around the risk of over-formalisation** that can erode volunteer engagement: *“As soon as you formalise something, everyone else steps back—because now someone has the job.”* Similar dynamics could undermine citizen involvement in preparedness if volunteer contributions are replaced by formal roles rather than supported.

Resource constraints and role overload is evidenced (see section on existing practices). Without earmarked funds, municipalities have little capacity to expand this role:

“The Total Defense report says municipalities must prioritise preparedness and staffing—but nothing happens without earmarked money.”

More funding could allow more systematic citizen outreach: *“More public meetings, inviting myself to residents' association meetings—to talk preparedness.”*

Uneven reach and social exclusion is also reported: engaging youth and socially excluded groups is particularly challenging. Conversely, nearly 18 % of the working-age population receives disability benefits, representing a segment that is often hard to reach. Finally, openness has limits: *“A preparedness plan shouldn't be fully posted for public hearing”*; involvement is best targeted rather than having the entire plan out for review.

3.1.5 TERRITORIAL NETWORK

The county holds monthly meetings with preparedness coordinators from the municipalities and runs regional events on the theme of total defense. The County Emergency Preparedness Council has representatives from public agencies, critical infrastructure actors, volunteers and business groups, serving both as a voice channel and input to the resource bank. Cross-county work is described as seamless when hazards cross borders. The county emphasises that resident engagement *“must be done as close as possible to the population—the principle of proximity*, while the county's role is to assist municipalities—give advice and guidance and liaise with ministries.”

While formal contact points exist, much of the collaboration occurs through informal “back-channels” that enable quick exchange of ideas and feedback. This informal mode of communication allows the municipality to push practical initiatives upward. A hybrid model of governance (institutional and relational) allows flexibility and rapid mobilisation, but also carries the risk of person-dependence and uneven continuity. This makes for a precarious balance: sustaining these networks will require light formalisation, enough to preserve memory and coordination, but not so much that it undermines the trust, pragmatism and community initiative on which the system depends.

3.2. ITALY: INTERVIEW RESULTS

This section summarises results from interviews conducted with three individuals in the administrations of Castelvecchio Calvisio and Castelraimondo.

3.2.2 TARGET INTERVIEWEES

The mayor, a technical officer and the technical officer responsible for the preliminary assessment of the Civil Protection Plan were interviewed in Castelvecchio Calvisio and Castelraimondo respectively.

3.2.2 EXISTING PRACTICES

Existing practices present in both administrations refer to dissemination and communication activities of the civil protection plans.

“We have organized dissemination activities for each update of the plan”

“All units of the Municipal operations center were involved”.

A recent example was a dissemination event in Castelraimondo attended by 200 people, out of a total population of 4500.

“A meeting was organized in the town square with local Civil Protection organisation (with various stands) to explain the plan”

Despite active outward communication from the authorities to the citizens, no plans currently exist in either administration to include citizens in the planning, revision or approval of civil protection plans. Rather, both Castelraimondo and Castelvecchio Calvisio stress the need for activities that result in better communication, visibility and access to the plan, mainly through the dedicated website.

“I would change the way information is communicated (detailed analysis of specific themes) and improve the municipal website”

3.2.3 NEEDS

Neither administration pinpoints specific sections of the plan where citizens may be able to contribute with their experience.

“We involve the local Civil Protection organisation for the plan's update”

“We work at provincial and regional level with the first responders”

Having said that, interviewees from both administrations express the hope for increased participation and citizen involvement in the preparation and updating of the civil protection plans.

“We hope for greater dialogue with citizens”

3.2.4 OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Opportunities for participatory activities involving citizens exist in both administrations, and the interviewees emphasise the importance of maintaining direct and informal relationships with citizens. Opportunities centre on two formal instances facilitating citizen involvement. *“In this municipality we are a unique big family”*

First, the administration of Castelvecchio Calvisio organises intergenerational meetings to transfer the knowledge, experiences and memories of older people to younger ones. For example, during meetings after the earthquake of 2009, the older people told stories of the 1915 earthquake that were passed down to them, thus providing a spatial and historical perspective and context to the current event. The second instance concerns a large dissemination event in the municipality of Castelraimondo, attracting 200 attendees. This was a direct communication event, allowing citizens to ask questions and receive information about the civil protection plan.

“Citizens appreciated the direct contact with a civil protection expert”

Challenges to integrating citizen knowledge concern two issues. First, both administrations privilege outward communication to citizens at the cost of activities that might activate the local community in a more formal participatory process. The second issue, specific to Castelvecchio Calvisio, concerns the administration’s decision to prioritise a direct communication approach because they deem it to be more attractive to citizens than a formal participatory process.

“The people prefer informal relationships”

“More dialogue between municipal public offices of different municipalities”

3.2.5 TERRITORIAL NETWORK

Both administrations highlight contacts with CSOs. Castelraimondo mentioned the local organisation whereas Castelvecchio Calvisio noted contacts with the provincial civil protection organisation (the municipality does not have a municipal civil protection association). Castelraimondo also noted the activation of the Fire and Rescue Services for fire prevention. Conversely, Castelvecchio Calvisio focused on its collaboration with the Alpini group. Contacts with these groups take place in the context of emergency management and no channels of involvement of additional stakeholders were mentioned.

“It is important to implement more initiatives to disseminate the civil protection plan among citizens”

3.3. ROMANIA: INTERVIEW RESULTS

This section summarises results from interactions conducted with representatives of local and county authorities from Galați, Harghita, Suceava counties and Bucharest's Sector 4, involved in planning, preparedness and emergency response activities.

Based on the interview guide (developed in D2.1), the procedure for conducting written interviews involved sending a set of questions formulated by the Department for Emergency Situations (DSU) experts to respondents from the selected institutions via e-mail to a previously established contact address. This method allowed respondents to formulate their responses in a clear and structured manner, sometimes with the support of internal data or consultation with other departments, while also providing flexibility in time management and ensuring traceability and archiving of correspondence throughout the interview process.

Sending the interviews to local authority representatives in written format, via e-mail, was the most appropriate method to ensure an efficient process adapted to the time constraints of all parties involved. Representatives of local and county authorities usually have busy schedules, and scheduling face-to-face meetings can be difficult and could lead to delays in information collection. Also, some of the representatives of local and county authorities are involved in current operational activities, which require constant presence in the field or rapid reactions to emergency situations. The written format provided the necessary flexibility for them to respond according to their availability, without being conditioned by a fixed time slot.

3.3.1 TARGET INTERVIEWEES

A total of 12 officials sent their written reflections from four case-study areas (Bucharest, Galați, Harghita and Suceava), covering county-level institutions (ISU, Prefectures/CJSU) and local authorities (CLSU/UAT).

Participating institutions included prefectures, county councils, municipalities and inspectorates for emergency situations, who provided information on the current mechanisms of coordination, public consultation and interinstitutional cooperation.

3.3.2 EXISTING PRACTICES

The analysis revealed several examples of good practices. More specifically, the Bucharest's Sector 4 Model has established a formal system for collecting and analysing citizen feedback, based on simplified forms, online questionnaires and direct interaction between the public sector and various publics during preparedness activities. Second, the "Inclusive Disaster Resilience" project in Galați County, implemented with international support, promotes the training of persons with disabilities and the development of a culture of inclusion in disaster preparedness. Third, several national preventive information campaigns, such as "Be Prepared", "Don't Tremble at the Earthquake", or "Stop Improvisations" demonstrate the efficiency of cooperation between central and local authorities in educating the population. Fourth, the online publication of preparedness plans in several counties (e.g., Suceava) contributes to transparency, administrative accountability and increased public trust. Fifth, the integration of preventive education activities in the school

system, through lessons, workshops and practical exercises, is organised in collaboration with local inspectorates for emergency situations. Finally, some local authorities also use modern communication tools such as official Facebook pages, mobile apps or local web platforms to deliver warnings, preventive messages and awareness information to citizens. These instruments enhance responsiveness and administrative transparency in the relationship with the public.

3.3.3 NEEDS

Despite the progress reported by the interviewees, the analysis identified several challenges that affect the effectiveness of citizen engagement processes:

- Lack of a uniform methodology for public consultation in the field of civil protection, leading to varied approaches among counties and reduced interoperable data.
- Low civic participation, due to limited information dissemination, low interest in periods without major crises and the absence of easily accessible communication channels.
- Absence of specialised digital tools to collect, centralise and automatically analyse citizen feedback.
- Insufficient human and financial resources, limiting the authorities' ability to organise regular participatory activities. There is also a need for mechanisms that encourage citizens to remain actively engaged even outside crisis periods.
- Lack of formal cooperation between neighbouring local authorities, despite the fact that risks such as floods, fires and earthquakes often transcend administrative boundaries.

Taken together, these limitations highlight the need for an integrated, standardised and digitalised approach to transform public consultation into a predictable and effective process.

3.3.4 OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

The interviews indicate that Romania benefits from a well-organised institutional framework in the field of emergency management, characterised by extensive interinstitutional coordination and cooperation among administrative structures - prefectures, county councils, municipalities, inspectorates for emergency situations, educational institutions, economic operators and NGOs.

Planning and training activities are carried out periodically in accordance with national legislation, and preparedness plans are updated annually based on identified risks. However, citizen involvement in the drafting and updating process remains limited, often informal and unevenly applied across counties.

Preventive education and public awareness campaigns are key pillars of community resilience. Nevertheless, public interest in training tends to increase significantly only in the aftermath of major events (fires, floods, pandemics) and subsequently declines, highlighting the need for continuous and participatory communication mechanisms.

Another recurring finding is the lack of dedicated digital tools for collecting and managing public feedback, as well as the absence of a unified methodological framework at national level for consulting citizens on civil protection matters.

3.3.5 TERRITORIAL NETWORK

Romania has a solid institutional cooperation network in the field of civil protection, coordinated by the Department for Emergency Situations (DSU) and implemented through the County Inspectorates for Emergency Situations (ISU). At the local level, authorities cooperate with prefectures, county councils, municipalities, educational institutions, economic operators, NGOs and volunteers involved in population preparedness and emergency response activities.

This cooperation is supported by the national legal framework on emergency management, which clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of each actor. Collaboration is particularly effective during the planning, training and response phases, being strengthened through joint exercises, public information campaigns and preventive education activities carried out in partnership.

Examples from Galați, Harghita, Suceava counties and Bucharest's Sector 4 show a consistent involvement of local authorities and educational institutions in population preparedness activities. At the same time, relations with NGOs are gradually increasing, especially in projects dedicated to vulnerable groups and persons with disabilities.

However, inter-county and cross-border cooperation remains limited, as there are no formal or standardised mechanisms for coordination between neighbouring counties. In a context where natural risks often transcend administrative boundaries, strengthening territorial networks - including through regional partnerships, exchanges of good practices and joint exercises - would significantly enhance resilience and improve the operational integration of local structures within the European Civil Protection Mechanism.

At the same time, citizen involvement in planning and preparedness processes remains limited, being mostly indirect, through educational or volunteer activities. The development of concrete forms of public consultation and the creation of active participation mechanisms at the local level would strengthen the relationship between authorities and communities, transforming the territorial network into a more open and collaborative framework for risk management.

Territorial differences in resources, administrative capacity and civic engagement levels highlight the need for flexible instruments adapted to local contexts. Such an approach would enable more balanced participation and strengthen community resilience at both the national and European levels.

3.4. INTERVIEWS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The text that follows describes key aspects based on the data from Norway, Italy and Romania.

Existing preparedness architecture: formal systems with informal gaps

All three countries operate within multi-level governance structures that distinguish between national/regional and local responsibilities. Norway's County Governor offices supervise municipalities' risk analysis (ROS), plans and exercises - a formal framework that increasingly coexists with informal coordination through "back-channels" and peer networks. Italy's administrations disseminate civil protection plans through official channels and websites, but make

no institutional provision for citizens in planning revision or approval. Romania has established a comprehensive legal framework coordinated by the Department for Emergency Situations (DSU), with clear role definitions and mandatory planning cycles.

However, the formal apparatus belies a more complex reality. In all three countries, much of operational effectiveness depends on tacit knowledge, personal relationships and informal capacity. Norway's finding mirrors a broader pattern: formal plans and real-world performance correlate weakly. Italy's administrations lack even baseline mechanisms to identify where citizen expertise could contribute. Romania's system, while institutionally robust, remains "mostly indirect" in involving citizens - limited to educational activities and volunteering rather than genuine co-production of plans.

The citizen knowledge gap: recognised but largely untapped

Across all three countries, preparedness officials acknowledge that residents possess critical, experience-based knowledge that formal systems overlook. In Norway, residents know which settlements may be cut off during floods, which forest routes remain passable, who among neighbours depends on medical devices and where informal competence (retired nurses, radio operators) clusters. During Storm Hans, local knowledge identified detours that enabled continued delivery of food and medicine when main roads washed out. Yet, this form of knowledge remains largely undocumented and person-dependent, creating vulnerability to turnover and scale.

Italy's intergenerational meetings represent an exception; conveying earthquake narratives from elders to younger residents provides spatial and historical context to current events. However, neither Italian public authority in this study have formalised mechanisms to systematically extract or integrate such knowledge into preparedness planning. Romania similarly recognises that citizen feedback and knowledge could enhance planning, but lacks a uniform methodology for public consultation and specialised digital tools to collect and analyse it.

The core problem is structural: citizen knowledge is valued rhetorically but not institutionalised. In Norway, one informant captured the predicament: "*[Citizens] don't necessarily see themselves as having 'preparedness expertise,' but they do have thoughts about how a situation would affect them - and not just them, but their neighbourhood, maybe the whole village.*" This reflection contains enormous practical value, yet no systematic framework exists to capture, evaluate or integrate it.

Participation models

The three countries exhibit distinct participation models, each with particular limitations.

Norway operates a de facto hybrid model, relying on informal civic networks, voluntary organisations as "force multipliers" and strong cultural expectations of participation through *dugnad* (collective volunteer effort). Preparedness coordinators emphasise that "voluntary adherence is quite substantial" and that citizens respond when crises are "clearly a community problem." Yet, this model carries vulnerabilities: much of the capacity is person-dependent; spontaneous help poses safety and liability concerns; urban contexts show weaker neighbourhood ties and potential "bystander effects"; and over-formalisation risks deterring volunteers ("*as soon as you formalise something, everyone else steps back*").

Italy privileges outward communication over bidirectional participation. Dissemination events allow information flow from the authorities to the public and citizens can ask questions, but administrations do not really allow for participatory processes in planning revision or approval. One Italian interviewee stated the preference clearly: direct communication is *"more attractive to citizens than a formal participatory process."* This reflects a communication-centric, rather than co-production, model.

Romania uses primarily indirect engagement, through educational programmes in schools, inclusion projects for vulnerable groups and public awareness campaigns. These channels raise preparedness literacy but do not activate citizens in planning or policy revision. Formal cooperation structures exist among institutions (prefectures, councils, inspectorates, NGOs) but do not systematically include citizens' voices. In summary, none of the three countries have institutionalised mechanisms for citizens to contribute directly to plan drafting, revision of risk assessments or prioritisation of preparedness measures.

Resource constraints

A recurring constraint across all three countries is insufficient dedicated funding and staffing for preparedness work, which in turn limits the time available for citizen engagement.

In Norway, preparedness coordinators in municipalities allocate - a fraction of their full-time effort that leaves little capacity for systematic outreach. As one informant explained, *"without earmarked money, municipalities have little capacity to expand this role."* The suggested solution - *"more public meetings, inviting myself to residents' association meetings"* - remains aspirational without resource reallocation.

Romania explicitly identifies insufficient human and financial resources as limiting *"the authorities' ability to organise regular participatory activities"* and constraining mechanisms to keep citizens engaged outside crisis periods. The lack of dedicated digital infrastructure - Italy and Romania both lack centralised systems for collecting, storing and analysing citizen feedback - further compounds fragmentation.

This resource scarcity is not merely technical; it shapes institutional priorities. Italy's preference for outreach over participation, and Romania's reliance on indirect educational channels, reflect pragmatic choices concerning where limited capacity can be deployed. Yet the trade-off is clear: systems remain largely top-down, with citizens' voices being integrated only at the margins.

Challenges to scaling participation

All three countries face distinct but overlapping barriers to meaningful citizen involvement, especially with regard to marginalised populations. In Norway, nearly 18 per cent of the working-age population receives disability benefits—*"a segment often hard to reach."* The Romanian respondents highlight *"territorial differences in resources, administrative capacity and civic engagement levels"* that perpetuate uneven participation. The Italian interviewees do not explicitly address inclusion, though their emphasis on direct communication and intergenerational transfer may inadvertently exclude those without strong community ties.

Another challenge is the mismatch between citizen involvement in rural and urban contexts: Norway's successes rest partly on rural social cohesion, flexible networks and familiarity: *"[These]*

features are harder to replicate in larger, more anonymous urban settings where neighbourhood ties are weaker and time pressures higher." The Romanian and Italian participants do not explicitly address this, but the reliance on local networks and informal relationships suggests similar scalability challenges in urban centres.

There is an expectation and communication gap about what municipalities can and cannot deliver in prolonged crises - a necessary precursor to genuine public engagement. As one informant (from Norway) stated, *"It's clear that once we make these plans, citizens must be informed about them, so they know what to expect from the municipality."* The Romanian informants similarly emphasise the need for *"continuous and participatory communication mechanisms"* to sustain engagement beyond post-crisis spikes. This was not explicitly addressed in the Italian interviews, but the prevalence of dissemination over dialogue suggests expectations remain unaligned.

Opportunities for institutional adaptation

Despite these challenges, the data suggests concrete opportunities for increasing citizen involvement that respects the local context and institutional capacity:

Systematic knowledge mapping without bureaucracy: The Norwegian proposal to formalise *"hidden competences"* through simple registries rather than heavy administration offers a potential model. Romania and Italy could adapt this approach, using low-tech tools (local workshops, online surveys, digital platforms) to create inventories of citizen expertise linked to specific preparedness tasks. Such registries require minimal formalisation yet preserve the accessibility and flexibility that sustain voluntary engagement.

Integration of citizen feedback into planning cycles: Romania's Bucharest–Sector 4 model demonstrates that *"simplified forms, online questionnaires and direct interaction"* can systematise feedback collection. Italy's intergenerational meetings show that thematic, time-bounded conversations (focused on specific events or vulnerabilities rather than entire plans) attract participation and generate usable input. All three countries could adopt annual citizen workshops or focused consultation on specific plan components, making citizen input visible and traceable through plan updates.

Leveraging existing social infrastructure: Norway's use of cultural events, local cafés, sports clubs and farmers' associations as communication and coordination nodes demonstrates efficiency. Italy's intergenerational meetings and dissemination events activate community spaces. Romania's school-based preventive education reaches youth. Rather than creating parallel participation structures, all three could strengthen engagement by embedding preparedness conversations in existing civic forums and routine local interactions.

Territorial cooperation and cross-border networks: The Romanian respondents explicitly identify the need to strengthen *"inter-county and cross-border cooperation"* through *"regional partnerships, exchanges of good practices and joint exercises."* Norway's Gjøvik regional network - a *"lightweight coordination"* model that emerged bottom-up during COVID - offers a template: regular peer meetings among preparedness coordinators to share templates and practical innovations, thereby reducing duplication and accelerating learning. This model could be adapted for Italian municipalities and Romanian counties.

Digital tools as facilitators, not replacements: The Romanian informants identify the need for specialised digital tools to collect and analyse citizen feedback. Such tools could enable systematic, scalable participation without requiring in-person meetings that resource-constrained systems cannot sustain. However, the Norwegian and Italian data suggest that digital tools are most effective when they support and amplify existing relationships rather than replacing them—e.g., document informal networks, coordinate distributed volunteers and disseminate information efficiently.

3.5. CONCLUSIONS

The interview data from Norway, Italy and Romania demonstrates that the potential for citizen involvement in emergency preparedness remains largely unrealised across diverse institutional and cultural contexts. Norway's volunteer-rich, informally coordinated system captures tacit knowledge but struggles to systematise and scale it; Italy's communication-focused approach maintains public awareness but forgoes participatory co-production; and Romania's robust institutional framework coordinates agencies effectively but merely engages citizens indirectly.

A path forward exists, but it requires movement on multiple fronts: modest formalisation that preserves voluntary initiative, dedicated resources for systematic engagement and adaptation of participation mechanisms to local contexts. The core insight is that citizen knowledge and capacity are superfluous material to be added once formal systems are complete - they are foundational to societal resilience. All three countries would benefit from moving beyond communication toward genuine co-production, integration of experiential knowledge into planning, and sustained mechanisms that keep citizens engaged in preparedness work.

The differences among the three countries are instructive not as evidence of best practice but as demonstrations that context matters. Yet the convergence on underlying challenges - formalisation risk, resource scarcity, equity concerns and the persistence of tacit rather than documented knowledge - suggests that the solutions, though locally specific in implementation, rest on shared views and principles: proximity, transparency, respect for voluntary initiative and commitment to systemising knowledge that communities already possess.


4. CLIPP PROCEDURE WORKSHOPS

4.1. INITIAL VERSION OF THE CLIPP PROCEDURE

The CLIPP procedure is a step-by-step process demonstrating in practice how to integrate citizen knowledge in preparedness planning. This concerns operative plans at the municipal, regional and national levels. It operates through five key stages:

1. **Understanding Local Context:** Engaging with key stakeholders to identify needs, opportunities, and obstacles.
2. **Collecting Community Feedback:** Gathering input from citizens, volunteers, and community leaders during events, exercises, simulations, and discussions.
3. **Filtering and Prioritizing Feedback:** Identifying the most relevant and urgent lessons from community input.
4. **Revising Preparedness Plans:** Directly integrating citizens' feedback by authorities to refine future preparedness strategies.
5. **Communicating Improvements:** Informing the community about how their feedback has improved preparedness plans, demonstrating tangible results and encouraging further participation.

Figure 1. The CLIPP procedure and its five steps (version 1, 2025)



4.2. WORKSHOP PLANNING

The project has planned two workshops to present and gather feedback on the initial version of the CLIPP procedure. The aim of the workshops was to enable participants from key target groups, such as civil protection representatives, civil society organisations, community groups, local authorities and other relevant local stakeholders, to experience and provide comments on the CLIPP prototype. The session was designed to guide these diverse actors through each step of the procedure, allowing time for collaborative engagement, discussion and reflection. Activities were structured to prompt participants to identify potential barriers, enablers and opportunities relevant to each phase, while facilitators ensured that feedback was captured systematically.

Two workshops were conducted for this purpose, one in Italy and one in Norway. Participants were recruited through targeted outreach to the key stakeholder groups mentioned above, including civil protection authorities, civil society organisations and other relevant local actors. For this purpose, an invitation letter (Appendix C) was drafted and sent via email, clearly explaining the objectives of the Empower-Citizens project and the CLIPP procedure, the purpose and format of the workshop, and the value of participants' expertise and feedback. Recipients were also encouraged to recommend suitable representatives if they were unable to attend, ensuring broad and relevant participation. This outreach strategy helped secure a diverse group of stakeholders able to collaboratively evaluate and refine the CLIPP procedure.

The Norwegian workshop was conducted online, whereas the workshop in Italy was conducted *in situ*, reflecting contextual and spatial specificities. Both workshops followed the same overall structure: each session began with a presentation of the CLIPP procedure, including a detailed overview of each step, before participants moved into the group activities. For the group activities, each CLIPP step was presented on a single-page format, as shown in Figure 1. On each page, the left side displayed the step's title, a brief description and the titles of associated methods drawn from *The Book of Methods* (D2.1), while the right side outlined the five themes to be investigated (i.e., stakeholders, resources, barriers, opportunities and other comments or suggestions), each accompanied by guiding questions:

- **Stakeholders:** Who should lead this step and who needs to be involved?
- **Resources:** What resources, guidance or tools are necessary to carry out this step?
- **Barriers:** What risks or barriers could hinder the effective development of this step? What could make this step easier or more effective in your context?
- **Opportunities:** What opportunities could arise from successfully completing this step?
- **Other:** Any additional comments or suggestions regarding this step or the overall process?

This layout provided participants with a clear overview of each step, its purpose and the key aspects to explore during discussions.

Figure 2. CLIPP activity summary by step used in the workshops



Step 1. Understanding needs, opportunities, and barriers

Analysis of preparedness plans and interaction with local and civil protection authorities to identify needs, opportunities, and barriers.

Methods

- Stakeholder Mapping
- Interviews
- Surveys
- Photo elicitation

ACTORS

Who needs to be involved? Who should start the process? Who should lead it?

Local Authorities	First Responders	Associations				
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RESOURCES

What resources (i.e., information, tools, or coordination) would you need to carry out this step?

Interview Guide	Time	Personnel				
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BARRIERS

What **barriers** could prevent a good understanding of needs? OR What **barriers or challenges** might arise in your context?

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BENEFITS

Which **benefits** could this phase bring if deployed well?

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OTHER

Are there **any other aspects** needed to implement this in practice?

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4.3. SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP RESULTS

This section summarises the results of the workshops in Norway and Italy, and their implications for the improvement of the CLIPP procedure. Across both workshops, participants emphasised that the CLIPP model is realistic and useful.

Table 5. Feedback gathered on the CLIPP deriving from the Norwegian and Italian workshops

CLIPP Procedure	Norway (Innlandet)	Italy (Castelraimondo)
Step 1: Understanding needs, opportunities and barriers	Small municipalities rely heavily on deep local knowledge, personal networks and engaged volunteer organisations, such as Røde Kors, Norsk Folkehjelp and NKS. Resource lists, previous crisis experience, inter-municipal cooperation and communication channels are key tools. However, limited capacity, unclear expectations by volunteers and municipalities, insufficient training and technical vulnerabilities hinder effective preparedness. At the same time, strong community spirit, rapid volunteer mobilisation and	Workshop participants highlighted the need to involve trusted community figures to understand and reach all population groups, especially the most vulnerable. Participation can be limited by gaps in knowledge of Civil Protection Plans, outdated vulnerability mapping, privacy concerns and cultural or linguistic barriers.



	existing inter-municipal networks provide substantial opportunities for strengthening this step.	
Step 2: Identification and collection of feedback and lessons learnt	Municipalities use a mix of public meetings, preparedness week activities, school presentations, local stands, social media updates and volunteer hotlines to reach residents. Although these channels are valuable, it remains difficult to gather systematic input, especially from younger adults. Public meetings tend to attract older residents, and structured dialogue processes are often lacking. Opportunities include using schools to engage youth, deploying volunteers as communication “bridge-builders,” and leveraging local knowledge about vulnerable individuals and terrain.	Engaging local associations, such as <i>Io Non Crollo</i> ² , is essential due to their community trust and local knowledge. Existing initiatives, like schools or public stands in piazzas hosting the civil protection communication programme <i>Io Non Rischio</i> ³ , provide practical opportunities to gather citizens’ input. Barriers included limited understanding of the CLIPP procedure, resource constraints, privacy concerns and youth disengagement.
Step 3: Filtering and aggregation of feedback and lessons learnt	Municipal preparedness staff, volunteer organisations, the County Governor and inter-municipal networks all play a role in synthesising collected knowledge. Resource lists, contractor overviews, experiences from recent extreme weather events and ROS analyses are central tools. Yet, municipalities struggle with limited capacity, varying local practices and person-dependent knowledge. Participants highlighted strong opportunities through better inter-municipal cooperation, translating local experience quickly into updated procedures and having volunteers clearly articulate what they can contribute.	Synthesising feedback is challenging due to the need to prioritise input fairly, particularly from vulnerable groups, and the risk of overlooking less visible populations. This can result in only selected suggestions being integrated into the plan, which may reduce future participation.

² <https://www.iononcrollo.org/>

³ <https://eventi.protezionecivile.gov.it/en/i-dont-take-risks/>



Step 4: Intervention in preparedness plans	<p>Revision of plans usually rely on ROS-based plans, flexible action cards, regular administrative updates and insights from exercises and real incidents. Key barriers include weak follow-up of evaluations, exclusion of volunteers from after-action reviews and the challenge of maintaining systematic routines in small municipalities. However, participants saw clear value in using the CLIPP procedure methods to secure local knowledge, involving volunteers more directly in planning and holding regular low-cost exercises. Strengthened collaboration across actors was viewed as essential for improving plan quality and trust.</p>	<p>Revising preparedness plans is often hindered by limited funding, which can prevent the translation of previous steps into concrete actions and reduce the credibility of the process. Other barriers include the need to make civil protection plans that are easy to update and integrate over time, lack of knowledge of the plan among stakeholders (especially operational staff) and the emergence of vulnerabilities only during real emergencies, which require real-time updates.</p>
Step 5: Provision of feedback and further involvement of citizens	<p>A recurring issue is the lack of structured feedback to volunteers and residents after incidents. Municipalities often rely on generic “thank you” messages, leaving volunteers feeling overlooked. Participants underscored that personal, concrete recognition, such as visiting member meetings or organising events, greatly strengthens relationships. A stronger feedback culture would enhance volunteer motivation, improve recruitment and build trust for future emergencies.</p>	<p>Feedback provision is often limited to word-of-mouth communication or large assemblies, which can distort information, discourage vulnerable groups and produce low-quality feedback. Opportunities identified by participants include using small, targeted groups to enable meaningful discussions, frequent feedback cycles and clustering participants by similar needs. Participants also recommended combining digital tools, such as social media, with non-digital, accessible channels, paying attention to language and terminology. Other recommendations included being transparent and publishing the plan to demonstrate that the administration values preparedness and citizen input.</p>

4.4. CONCLUSIONS: MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS TO UPDATE CLIPP

The workshops held in Norway and Italy provided valuable insights into how the CLIPP procedure is understood, operationalised and experienced by municipal staff and CSOs. While the model is widely regarded as conceptually robust, participants emphasised that its practical implementation remains challenging, particularly for small municipalities with limited capacity. Based on the cross-country findings, this section outlines key recommendations for revising and improving the CLIPP procedure.

Present CLIPP as a flexible and accessible approach: Participants noted that the current procedure is perceived as extensive and sometimes rigid. To enhance usability, the next version should:

- Simplify language and reduce technical terminology.
- Emphasise that CLIPP is a flexible, modular approach, where municipalities can apply selected methods based on local needs and available resources.
- Highlight that partial use of CLIPP is both acceptable and valuable if resources do not allow for full implementation. Modular implementation should be conducted consciously to avoid fatigue of citizens. For example, if there is no feedback planned, citizens might feel that their participation was in vain.

This reframing will help municipalities feel less overwhelmed and more confident in adapting the model to their own context.

Reduce barriers for municipalities with limited capacity: Small municipalities repeatedly stressed that they lack the necessary staff, time and specialised competence to conduct a full CLIPP cycle. To reduce barriers to adoption, the revised procedure should offer:

- Step-by-step checklists written in clear, concise language.

Providing these tools will help ensure that even resource-constrained municipalities can engage meaningfully in collaborative crisis preparedness.

Clarify the roles of volunteers across all CLIPP steps: A common challenge concerns uncertainty about the responsibilities and expectations of volunteers (CSOs and spontaneous volunteers). To improve clarity and collaboration, CLIPP should include:

- Examples of formal and informal cooperation specifying roles, responsibilities and decision-making structures.

These additions will help ensure shared understanding and better coordination, as well as strengthen trust between municipalities and volunteer organisations.

Provide practical methods for systematic resident input: Municipalities requested clearer guidance on how to gather diverse and representative feedback from residents. The procedure should therefore include:

- Approaches for and examples of engaging younger residents, who are consistently underrepresented in traditional meeting formats.

- Advice on integrating data collection into ongoing municipal activities or existing community arenas.

Making this step more concrete will enhance the quality and representativeness of community input.

Improve feedback and recognition practices, and ongoing dialogue: A significant finding from both workshops is that volunteers and residents often receive little feedback after taking part in participatory processes. Participants emphasised the importance of recurring meeting arenas between municipalities and volunteer organisations. The revised procedure should:

- Offer examples of recognition practices, such as attending volunteer gatherings, sending individual follow-up messages or organising annual events.
 - Recommend an annual recurrent structure of events based on existing practices.

Strengthening this element is essential for maintaining volunteer motivation and trust. Embedding regular dialogue will help institutionalise collaboration and reduce person-dependency.

Enhance visual and practical usability: Participants appreciated the visual elements of the current CLIPP model but asked for more operational tools. The next version should include:

- One-page summaries for each step of CLIPP.
- Standardised icons and visual markers to clarify roles, outputs and action points.
- Enhanced visuals to make the procedure easier to understand, communicate and implement.

Simplified overview of the CLIPP steps: Finally, an important takeaway from the workshops is that the language must be accessible to a broad range of stakeholders, e.g., generalist policymakers. Following is a simplified version of the CLIPP procedure steps:

1. **Understanding the local context** - Engaging with key stakeholders to understand the local context in order to better establish a foundation for citizen participation.
2. **Fostering dialogue with citizens** - Having a dialogue with citizens to collect lived experiences, local insights, and practical lessons related to crisis management.
3. **Organising information** - Gaining an overview, categorising and validating information, and bridging professional and institutional expertise with residents' local experiences.
4. **Revising preparedness plans** - Updating preparedness plans based on the information and knowledge gathered in steps 1-3.
5. **Sharing lessons learned with citizens** - Ensuring transparency and motivating sustained participation in local emergency preparedness efforts.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Integrating citizen knowledge: insights and recommendations based on preparedness plans, interviews and workshops

An essential premise of the CLIPP procedure is its compatibility with ongoing preparedness processes and its practical usability. To ensure this, the work has involved a combination of approaches, including an analysis of preparedness plans, interviews with authorities and representatives from CSOs with links with citizens, and initial workshops presenting the CLIPP prototype. These activities have resulted in the following recommendations for the CLIPP procedure:

- Preparedness plans are primarily authority-centric, with limited or no involvement of citizens through the cycle. Risk assessment, planning, resource allocation, training and communication processes rely on institutional coordination and procedures. Mechanisms for evaluation and improvement exist, but they are driven by authorities and do not systematically incorporate citizen input. Overall, the preparedness plans mention citizens but lack truly participatory and two-way communication to enable citizen contributions to preparedness planning. While the comparison across three countries (Norway, Italy and Romania) shows commitment to communication to citizens and promoting citizen engagement, in practice the operationalisation of truly participatory mechanisms and active use of citizen knowledge remains underdeveloped (to different degrees).
- Interviews involving authorities show that practice is strongest in dissemination and communication in terms of events and use of social media. Local knowledge (e.g., local routes, vulnerable households, hidden competences) and informal networks are widely recognised as essential when dealing with limited resources, focus on the most urgent needs and alleviate pressure on professionals when dealing with limited resources and during acute situations. Although formalising the capture of citizen knowledge is recognised as a good way to shift citizens from being passive recipients of information to active contributors, resource constraints, especially in small municipalities with limited staffing and no centralised tools, further restrict participatory work and push towards top-down approaches. Yet, feasible opportunities exist without heavy bureaucracy, such as integrating simple feedback mechanisms into preparedness planning and embedding engagement in existing social infrastructure (schools, regular events). Strengthening territorial preparedness coordinators' peer networks offers opportunities to share experiences and methods, and avoid duplication, while country or national orchestration of systematic approach is crucial to ensure that small communities are not left to devise solutions alone. Overall, citizen knowledge and capacity should shift from rhetorical acknowledgement to institutional practice, making citizens active contributors, improving operational effectiveness, targeting scarce resources where the need is greatest, acknowledging formal and informal channels, and alleviating pressure on professionals during acute events.
- The workshops confirmed that the CLIPP procedure is conceptually strong and aligned with the needs of authorities to shift citizens' roles to more active contributors to improve

preparedness. However, it must evolve into a practical, flexible and capacity-sensitive toolkit. The improved version of CLIPP should therefore prioritise: (i) usability over completeness; (ii) templates and examples over descriptive text; and (iii) flexibility over standardisation. By integrating these elements, CLIPP can better support municipalities, particularly those with limited resources, in building robust, inclusive and collaborative systems for crisis preparedness and learning.

Insights and recommendations from the analysis of preparedness plans, interviews and workshops have been incorporated into the revised version of the CLIPP procedure. Further work will require implementing and operationalising the procedure in diverse contexts through partnerships between researchers, authorities and CSOs, with the purpose of maturing a tool that consolidates the body of knowledge of societal resilience and operational experience.

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APPENDIX A: FRAMEWORK TO ANALYSE PREPAREDNESS PLANS

The framework for the analysis preparedness plans consists of a common protocol and a reporting form. This approach has been developed in collaboration with authorities and NGOs participating in the project from Italy, Romania and Norway, prior to its application in these countries.

Background

Purpose

Provide a harmonised methodology and common ground to analyse preparedness plans across three countries, focusing on how citizen knowledge and prior experiences are recognised, gathered, used and institutionalised. Results will identify opportunities and barriers to integrating citizen knowledge in preparedness activities and plans.

Primary audience: Research team and collaborating country partners.

Scope: Current national, regional and local preparedness plans (all-hazards and hazard-specific)

Key terms:

- Citizen knowledge - contextual, lived, professional-volunteer, indigenous/traditional, community-based, tacit and crowdsourced knowledge held by residents, civil society and volunteer groups.
- Previous experiences - lessons learnt from past events, drills and AARs (after-action reviews), including narratives from the public.
- Integration - any methods, process or mandate through which citizen knowledge is sought, validated and used to inform preparedness.

Questions

- Where and how do plans acknowledge citizen knowledge and prior experiences?
- Through which mechanisms is citizen knowledge collected, validated and fed into the preparedness cycle?
- At what maturity level is citizen integration, and at which activities of the preparedness cycle?
- What legal, organisational, cultural and technical barriers and enablers affect integration?
- How are equity, inclusion and ethics addressed?

Document overview

Level: Three countries. Includes information about administrative levels (national; two subnational levels where relevant).

Plan types: All-hazards preparedness plans; hazard-specific plans (e.g., flood, wildfire, pandemic); supporting docs (risk assessments, comms strategies, training/exercise plans, SOPs).

Time window: Current versions

Target sample:

- National: 1–2 core plans + 1–3 supporting docs

- Regional: 2–3 plans across diverse regions/countries
- Local/Municipal: 2–3 plans across diverse settings

Context information

- Governance structure (T2.1 done)
- Legal mandates for participation
- Hazard profile
- Stakeholder mapping - Civil society landscape
- History of salient events
- Other (e.g., language/translation needs)

Analytical framework

Preparedness activities

- Assess (risk assessment, vulnerability mapping)
- Plan (strategy, roles, responsibilities, procedures)
- Resource (funding, staffing, partnerships)
- Train and exercise (including community drills)
- Communicate and engage (two-way/one-way? risk communication)
- Review and Improve (AARs, lessons learnt, audits)

Types of citizen knowledge: Lived experience, tacit, volunteer/first responder experience, traditional/indigenous knowledge, community mapping, citizen science/crowdsourcing, narratives from past events, local risk perceptions, local knowledge, community assets and capacities.

Modes of integration of citizen knowledge

- Awareness: The plan acknowledges citizen knowledge conceptually.
- Consultation: Surveys, hearings, comment periods, citizen panels.
- Collaboration/Co-production: Citizens/CSOs co-design assessments, plans or drills.
- Delegated/Community-led: Community-led preparedness recognised and resourced.

Barriers & enablers

- Legal/Mandates
- Institutional/Organisational (roles, coordination, capacity)
- Operational/Procedural (clear steps, templates, timelines)
- Resources (funding, time, training)
- Cultural/Attitudinal (trust, authority views, stigma)
- Technical/Data (platforms, standards, accessibility)
- Ethics/Privacy (data protection, consent, risk)
- Equity & Inclusion (representativeness, language access, disability inclusion, digital divide)

Reporting template for analysing citizen knowledge in preparedness plans

Objective: To identify areas where contribution from citizens can be integrated in the preparedness plans. Using the common protocol for the analysis, provide the following information:

1. Document overview: Level (National/Regional/Municipal), Issuing Authority, Plan Title, Year, Hazard Type, Duration, Notes

2. Context information

- Governance structure (centralised vs. federal, disaster risk management system)
- Legal basis for citizen participation (laws, policies, mandates)
- Hazard profile (most relevant risks for region/municipality in last decade/trends?)
- Stakeholder mapping, civil society/volunteer landscape, formal and informal actors, particular groups at risk
- Historical events shaping preparedness
- Other

3. Findings from applying the analytical framework

- Preparedness activities covered (Assess, Plan, Resource, Train & Exercise, Communicate & Engage, Review & Improve)
- Types of citizen knowledge recognised (lived, volunteer, indigenous, crowdsourced, etc.)
- Modes of integration, Presence of citizen knowledge (where/how)
- Barriers/enablers explicitly named
- Barriers: No formal mechanisms to collect, validate and reuse citizen knowledge (consultations, minipublics, citizen science, participatory mapping, story-based lessons learnt).
- No feedback loop showing how public inputs affect decisions (accountability).
- No equity/inclusion provisions (language access, accessibility, targeted outreach)
- No KPIs for engagement quality or coverage; no resourcing for it.
- AARs do not require citizen perspectives.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

- Opportunities for strengthening citizen knowledge integration
- Barriers to address (legal, organisational, technical, cultural)
- Actionable recommendations per level (national/regional/local)

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE

A common approach was developed to identify needs, opportunities and barriers to integrate citizen knowledge into preparedness plans. This work has been developed within Task 2.1 of the Empower Citizens project in close collaboration with authorities and NGOs participating in the project from Italy, Romania and Norway, prior to its application in these countries.

PLEASE NOTE: This guide is not intended to be a rigid list of questions to be put to the interviewee. Rather, it is intended to give the interviewer an overview of the various points of interest for our analysis. Depending on the context and the interviewee's answers, it will be adapted and interpreted to gather information and at the same time to introduce the themes/issues addressed by the project.

Purpose of the Interview guide

This interview guide aims at identifying (i) formal and informal routines and practices used to collect, curate and integrate citizen knowledge and citizen perspectives in the drafting and implementing of preparedness plans, and (ii) needs, barrier and opportunities to integrate citizen knowledge and citizen perspectives in preparedness plans.

Target interviewees

These questions are aimed at public servants in regional and local governments. [Note: there will be a separate, less structured interview guide for CSO and NGO officials]

How to use the interview guide

This interview is designed to collect information for qualitative analyses and as such it does not constitute a questionnaire or survey. The interview is meant to be a conversation, during which the interviewees answer the questions in a dialectic fashion. For this reason, the questions are written in a conversational tone and in the active, rather than passive, voice. The questions highlighted in bold are the most important, the other questions are complementary.

[INTRODUCTION] - Questions to break the ice and introduce the topics that will be discussed during the meeting

1. [Instructions to the interviewer: this is an open-ended question aimed at opening the interview broadly. Prior to asking any questions, please ask the interviewee to consent to being recorded, to sign and date the informed consent, and to identify themselves.]
2. Please describe your position and how your work relates to preparedness and specifically drafting and implementing preparedness plans.
3. The 2023 Hans severely affected large areas. As a public servant, do you think that citizens should be more involved in their own preparedness? Do you think there is a difference in citizen preparedness before and after the storm? In what way?

[EXISTING PRACTICES]

4. How is information or feedback from citizens used in the development or revision of preparedness plans?
5. Where do you see opportunities in involving citizen perspectives in your preparedness work? Do you have any good-practice examples? Are there phases in the planning process more suitable to involving citizen perspectives? Is this process sustainable and replicable?
 - a. Follow up question: do you collaborate with CSOs to reach citizens?
6. An evaluation came out in 2023. Since the Hans event, have you introduced any new routines or practices to involve citizens in your preparedness work? Is the *totalberedskap* report relevant in your work relating to citizen involvement?
If yes, could you describe what these are? If not, could you explain why not?
7. Have you adopted any new forms of communication to inform citizens about preparedness or emergency management since the Hans event?
If yes, please describe them. If not, could you share why not?
8. Do you have any means to filter and curate any citizen input? Can you give an example?
9. Are there specific arenas and routines where citizens and local authorities can discuss preparedness (formal and informal)? And if so, are any routines or guidelines on how authorities provide feedback to citizens input?
10. How do you raise awareness among different populations on preparedness measures?
11. How is the plan adapted to different kinds of populations?
12. Innlandet is known for its mountainous and rural areas, rich cultural heritage and strong agriculture industry and energy. Are there specific preparedness measures for tourism, agriculture and industrial operators, are there specific preparedness measures for diverse populations/citizens?

[NEEDS] –In which points of the plan can information coming from citizens be integrated?

13. What additional tools, resources, or capacities would make it easier to involve citizens meaningfully?
14. Are there types of knowledge (local, experiential, historical) from citizens that you wish you had more access to?

[OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES] - What are the opportunities and barriers for integrating citizen knowledge and experiences?

15. What are the main benefits and opportunities of including citizen perspectives in the drafting and implementation of preparedness plans?
16. What are the barriers imposed by national legislation for the purpose of collecting and using citizens' knowledge? What is the degree of autonomy of local authorities in this regard? (this information is available in public documents, no need to ask, check. Bureaucratic issues).
17. What are the main challenges and limitations (formal and informal) in involving citizens in the drafting and implementation of preparedness plans? (Open question, but we have in mind, time, money, capacity, legal constraints, trust, representation issues, lack of interest)

[TERRITORIAL NETWORK] - What are the relationships with other stakeholders?

18. Are there any plans (formal and informal) on people involvement with neighbouring municipalities?
19. Which jurisdictions and other organisations do you collaborate with and how?

Reporting template - Interview guide

Purpose of the Interview Guide: This interview guide aims at identifying (i) formal and informal routines and practices used to collect, curate and integrate citizen knowledge and citizen perspectives in the drafting and implementing of preparedness plans, and (ii) needs, barrier and opportunities to integrate citizen knowledge and citizen perspectives in preparedness plans.

Target Interviewees: These questions are aimed at public servants in regional and local governments. [Note: same interview guide from T2.1 but less structured for CSO and NGO officials]

How to use the results report: This template is designed to summarize the collected qualitative information. It uses the questions highlighted in bold in the interview guide, as these questions are the most important. The other questions are complementary and can be documented as required.

[INTRODUCTION] - Questions to break the ice and introduce the topics that will be discussed during the meeting

Guide to findings: Use facts, reference to existing plans and, if possible supporting stories/examples.

[EXISTING PRACTICES] *Guide to findings: Use facts, reference to existing plans and, if possible supporting stories/examples.*

[NEEDS] –In which points of the plan can information coming from citizens be integrated?

Guide to findings: Use facts, reference to existing plans and, if possible supporting stories/examples.

[OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES] - What are the opportunities and barriers for integrating citizen knowledge and experiences?

Guide to findings: Use facts, reference to existing plans and, if possible supporting stories/examples.

[TERRITORIAL NETWORK] - What are the relationships with other stakeholders?

Guide to findings: Use facts, reference to existing plans and, if possible supporting stories/examples.

APPENDIX C: WORKSHOP MATERIAL

This section presents material prepared for the workshops. The material was first prepared in the English language and then translated into Norwegian and Italian.

Invitation letter

SUBJECT: Invitation to the Empower-Citizens workshop, [*add date*]

Dear [*insert participant name*],

We are pleased to invite you to the Empower-Citizens workshop, which will take place [*insert location, date and time*].

The [Empower-Citizens project](#) - Empowering Citizens by Considering their Feedback in Preparedness Plans - aims to develop and test a new procedure for integrating citizens' direct experience and feedback into local preparedness plans (click here to watch our first 3-minutes video describing the project). It is essential that the procedure is adapted to authorities' working processes. The procedure, called CLIPP (Citizen & authority Learning and Improving Preparedness Plans), will be evaluated through the revision of two real preparedness plans in Italy and Norway, with the results scaled up for wider application at the European level and presented in practical guidelines and support tools.

The workshop will bring together stakeholders from across [*insert country, region*] to present the first version of the CLIPP prototype. Our goal is to generate outcomes that can be directly integrated into local authorities' operations while addressing the specific needs of their communities. For this reason, your participation and feedback would be invaluable in refining the CLIPP procedure to ensure it meets practical needs and expectations.

Please reply to this email by [*insert suitable deadline*] to confirm your attendance. If you are unable to attend, we would appreciate your recommendations of suitable representatives with relevant expertise.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us. In the meantime, you can follow the project through our official Empower-Citizens [LinkedIn](#) and [Facebook](#) channels.

We look forward to your participation and contribution to this exciting workshop.

Best regards,

Facilitator script for the online workshop

When: 17th November Time 09:00-10:30 CEST – 90 min

Facilitator Composition: NSR- XX (facilitator), XX (support facilitator), XX (Notetaker), XX (time keeper)

Workshop description: The workshop will bring together stakeholders from across Innlandet, region to discuss the first version of the CLIPP prototype. Our goal is to generate outcomes that can be directly integrated into local authorities' operations while addressing the specific needs of their communities. For this reason, feedback would be invaluable in refining the CLIPP procedure to ensure it meets practical needs and expectations.

Part 1 (10 minutes) – Opening interactive warm-up and intro (Moderator)

The moderator will define the scope of the workshop, expected outcome, practical outline and netiquette:

- Mute yourself / turn video on
- Group picture – without names?
- Technical question use chat
- Statements or content – raise your hand
- Informal tone, all inputs appreciated
- No recording

Part 2 (15 minutes) – Opener 1 – Tour the table (Moderator - all)

Participants presentation

Please say your name, organisation, 1 expectation (or experience/role around the event)

Part 2 (5 minutes) – CLIPP Introduction – (Moderator)

Introducing CLIPP procedure step by step

Part 3 (50 mins) – Group work walking together through CLIP Steps

Questions and answers interaction with the audience (moderator will share questions and direct them to the participants). All "external" participants are invited to answer the following question through power point/mentimeter

Prompt questions:

- STAKEHOLDERS - Who should lead this step and who needs to be involved?
- RESOURCES - What resources, guidance, or tools are necessary to carry out this step?
- BARRIERS - What risks or barriers could hinder the effective development of this step? What could make this step easier or more effective in your context?
- OPPORTUNITIES - What opportunities could arise from successfully completing this step?
- OTHER - Any additional comments or suggestions regarding this step or the overall process?

Part 5 (10 mins) – Plenary presentation

Conclusion main inputs from each step

Part 6 (1 mins) – Closing: Conclusion and next steps

Moderator will conclude the workshop with invitation to online evaluation – what works well and what can be improved

APPENDIX D: RESULTS OF THE WORKSHOP IN NORWAY



Empower-Citizens Workshop Report

Location: Online

Date: 17th November 2027

Language during the workshop: Norwegian

Authors: Ivonne Herrera, Gudveig Gjørund, Lucia Liste, Evangelia Petridou

List of participants

No.	Organisation	Name and Surname
1	Norwegian People's Aid	CSO – volunteer organisation
2	Red Cross	CSO – volunteer organisation
3	Norwegian Women's Public Health Association	CSO – volunteer organisation
4	County Governor of Innlandet	Monica Lunde
5	Municipality A	Preparedness coordinator
7	Municipality B	Preparedness coordinator
8	NTNU Samfunnsforskning	Ivonne Herrera
9	NTNU Samfunnsforskning	Gudveig Gjørund
10	NTNU Samfunnsforskning	Evangelia Petridou
11	NTNU Samfunnsforskning	Lucia Liste


Objective

No.	Objective
1	Present a first version of the CLIPP procedure by having participants collaboratively engage and discuss all its steps— identifying opportunities, challenges, and barriers for adopting the procedure.
2	Discuss the CLIPP procedure prototype.
3	Receive feedback to refine the CLIPP procedure and its practical usability.
4	Generate a procedure that can be integrated into local authorities operations while addressing specific local needs of their communities

Agenda

No.	Topic
1	Welcome and introduction
2	CLIPP procedure
3	Interactive session visiting each step of the CLIPP procedure
4	Conclusions and next step

CLIPP procedure



CLIPP steps

No.	Topic	Beskrivelse
1	<p>Step 1 – Understand needs, opportunities, and barriers for including citizen knowledge in emergency preparedness</p> <p>Explanation: Mapping / Assessment</p>	<p>Actor:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Important – Key people with local community knowledge and contacts ● Municipalities: crisis management, emergency preparedness coordinators, technical sector ● Voluntary organisations: Red Cross, Norwegian People’s Aid, the Women’s Public Health Association (NKS) ● The County Governor ● Residents (particularly engaged individuals, older participants, youth via school channels) ● Businesses (entrepreneurs, construction/machinery contractors) ● Other emergency preparedness actors (Civil Defence, fire service, police) <p>Resources (mapping of human and physical resources, both formal and informal):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Local knowledge and personal networks (very important in small municipalities) ● Planning documents ● Resource lists (overview of what exists): volunteer groups, contractors, farmers, equipment agreements with volunteers ● Facebook and other communication channels ● Exercises and experience base ● Inter-municipal networks among preparedness personnel ● Alert systems (understanding of early warning) ● Mapping of evacuation rooms/locations and field hospitals

		<p>Barriers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Insufficient training, especially involving volunteers. ● Municipalities have small emergency preparedness staff and limited capacity. ● Unclear expectations between municipalities and volunteers regarding roles and responsibilities. ● Lack of regular meeting arenas for cooperation between municipalities and volunteer organisations. ● In some municipalities, volunteers are not included in the emergency preparedness council. ● Large-scale exercises are perceived as difficult and resource-intensive to organize. ● Resource lists are not effectively utilised during incidents. <p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteers possess significant expertise and specialised equipment that the municipality lacks. ● Inter-municipal cooperation contributes to learning and more robust solutions. ● Rapid mobilisation through volunteer organisations. ● Small municipalities have short decision-making paths and strong informal networks. ● Strong community spirit and willingness to contribute. ● Exercises provide major benefits by clarifying roles and improving plans. <p>Other:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Missing opportunities to bring together volunteer organisations to talk with the municipality about what volunteers can contribute
2	<p>Step 2. Identifying and collecting feedback and experiences from residents</p> <p>Explanation / simplification: Dialogue</p>	<p>Actor</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Residents in general ● Engaged local community members (“resource persons” in the village) ● Youth (through schools and upper secondary schools) ● Volunteer organisations as information channels ● Local businesses (contractors, industry)



		<p>Resources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Public meetings● Emergency preparedness awareness week● Information stands and outreach work (Red Cross, NKS)● School presentations● Personal contact and “shop-floor conversations”● Local resource persons as “informal informants”● Alert/notification phone lines managed by volunteers?● Short Facebook posts and small informational videos from the municipality/Red Cross directed at residents <p>Barriers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Difficult to systematically collect information from residents● Low participation from younger adults (under 30–40)● Public meetings mainly attract older residents (“silver foxes”)● Not all municipalities include volunteers in the emergency preparedness council● Municipalities often lack the capacity to work systematically with dialogue● Lack of regular meeting points and structured processes <p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Public meetings build trust and familiarity, which are crucial in crises● Schools and colleges are effective channels for reaching young people● Volunteers can act as bridge-builders: they reach widely and create engagement● Information stands and local events reach a broader audience than traditional meetings● Alert/helpline phones provide support and increase the population’s sense of security
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		<p>Other</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Local knowledge about bottlenecks, streams, vulnerable individuals, and local infrastructure is important
3	Step 3. Filtering and synthesising residents' experiences	<p>Actors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Municipal administration (emergency preparedness coordinators, crisis management) ● The County Governor (as structural support, e.g., developing templates) ● Volunteer organisations as formal partners and bridges to the population ● Inter-municipal cooperation partners ● Local resource persons? <p>Resources</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Resource lists and action cards that can be continuously updated ● Procedures for alerting and using contractors ● Inter-municipal networks for sharing practices ● Local experiences from extreme weather events such as Hans, Amy, Gjerdrum, etc ● Agreements with volunteer organisations (e.g., for field hospitals, staffing, resources) ● Risk and vulnerability analyses (ROS) as a basic framework? ● Culture: community spirit ("dugnadsånd") <p>Barriers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Limited capacity in small municipalities to collect and systematize information ● Large variation in municipalities' capacity and practices ● Lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities – also between volunteer organisations ● Not all municipalities have regular meeting arenas with volunteers ● A need for more cooperation between the municipality and the County Governor, rather than the municipality having to find solutions alone

		<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Local experiences can quickly be turned into practical procedures that work (for example, an overview of available contractors). ● Inter-municipal cooperation can create more robust solutions than municipalities working along ● Volunteer organisations can develop concrete lists of what they can actually contribute, making it easier for the municipality to plan and conduct exercises <p>Other</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Discussing things in advance, before something happens
4	Step 4. Revision of emergency preparedness plans	<p>Actores</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The municipality’s emergency preparedness staff ● Formal involvement of volunteer organisations as bridges to resident ● The political level (approval of the overarching plan) ● The County Governor as an advisor <p>Resources</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Emergency preparedness plans with checklists based on the risk and vulnerability analysis (ROS) ● Easy-to-update action cards and attachments ● Evaluation after exercises and real incidents ● Administrative revision routines (4–5 times per year) ● The competence of volunteers – which can indirectly influence the plans ● Formal agreements with contractors <p>Barriers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Evaluations are often not followed up systematically ● Municipalities lack time and dedicated staff positions ● Volunteers are often not included in post-incident evaluations and plan revisions ● Large differences in practice between municipalities make standardisation difficult ● Risk of “person dependency”: local knowledge is held by a few individuals

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Formal agreements with businesses can be financially burdensome and may reduce the spirit of volunteerism <p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The clip-procedure can help “capture” local knowledge before key people leave ● Easily revisable action cards provide flexibility and continuous improvement ● Volunteers want to be involved, which leads to higher quality and better training ● Regular meetings and dialogue provide up-to-date information that strengthens the plan and collaboration ● Administrative revisions help ensure that changes are quickly identified <p>Other</p> <p>Close cooperation strengthens trust between formal and informal actors.</p>
5	Step 5. Feedback and continued involvement of citizens	<p>Actors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Volunteer organisations (who often feel they do not receive enough recognition) ● Residents who have contributed during incidents ● Municipal leadership and administration ● Local clubs/associations <p>Resources</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Appreciation events, member meetings, and social gatherings ● The municipality’s communication channels (Facebook, website) ● Emergency preparedness councils and evaluation meetings

		<p>Barriers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Limited structures for providing feedback in many municipalities ● Municipalities are often poor at giving concrete and personal thanks or recognition after an incident ● Communication tends to be too general (“thanks to everyone who contributed”) ● Volunteers are not always included in final evaluations and may feel overlooked <p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Good at inviting volunteers when there is a need ● Personal thanks (cake/kringla, attending their member meetings) strengthens relationships ● A strong feedback culture helps volunteers feel recognised and improves the quality of collaboration <p>Other</p> <p>Better feedback leads to: strengthened motivation among volunteers, improved recruitment, more informal and useful information flow, and increased trust during future incidents.</p>
6	<p>Overall recommendations – other comments</p>	<p>The procedure is perceived as realistic, useful, and provides structure where systematic approaches are often lacking.</p> <p>“I was skeptical at first, but the process is visual and systematic, and we can use it as a resource in small municipalities to communicate with residents.”</p>

APPENDIX E: RESULTS OF THE WORKSHOP IN ITALY



Empower-Citizens Workshop Report

Location: Castelraimondo, Italy

Date: 19 November, 2025

Authors: Erica Vannucci, Alberto Pasquini, Sonia Matera (Deep Blue)
Raniero Maggini, Maya Battisti, Michele Mansi (Cittadinanzattiva)

List of participants

Approximately 40 participants, including citizens' representatives, municipal actors, and first responders.

Meeting objective

Collect feedback on the first version of the CLIPP prototype.

Agenda

No.	Schedule	Topic
1	16:00 - 16:05	Arrival of participants
2	16:05 - 15:20	Institutional greetings
3	16:20 - 16:40	Introduction to the Empower-Citizens project and the CLIPP procedure
4	16:40 - 16:45	Introduction to the group work
5	16:45 - 18:30	Group work: walking through the CLIPP procedure

Topic Discussed

CLIPP Procedure	Feedback Collected
Step 1: Understanding needs, opportunities and barriers.	<p>Stakeholders</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Involve Critical Infrastructure Operators (shop owners, fuel station operators, communication, etc.). ● At the provincial level, the COP (Centro Operativo Provincial) could —and should— serve as a bridge, facilitating communication flows between institutions, associations, and the broader community. ● The involvement of actors such as the local priest and general practitioner could offer a more accurate and specific understanding of the population’s needs and concerns. Especially to reach the most vulnerable people and those who are hardest to engage through traditional communication methods. <p>Barriers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Lack of knowledge about Civil Protection Plans and incomplete understanding of the CLIPP procedure could limit the participation. ● Some mappings (e.g. vulnerable population) quickly become outdated, requiring constant updates. ● Privacy concerns: protecting personal data might limit the mapping of vulnerable people. Signed consent forms could overcome this issue. ● Excluding specific minority groups from the mapping process leading to incomplete or inequitable preparedness planning: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Increasingly multi-ethnic communities with diverse needs. For example, during the recent earthquake, emergency services had to set up a dedicated tent for prayer and provide basins for foot-washing, reflecting the cultural and religious requirements of some minority groups. ○ Difficulty in identifying all forms of fragility and disabilities within the local community: this could lead to an inaccurate mapping of vulnerable people. People with disabilities with specific dependence on electricity or medical equipment. ○ Growing presence of companion animals. Pet ownership is rising, and in crisis situations many people instinctively try to rescue their animals, sometimes putting themselves in even greater danger. ● Lack of knowledge about the needs and concerns of specific sectors (e.g. animal farming). ● Limited knowledge of the local area.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Lack of knowledge of emergency procedures. ● Need to manage intercultural factors. ● Difficulty in mapping individual needs and concerns, especially for people with disabilities. ● Need for constant updates of the information used in maps and records. ● A common factor across multiple steps is the lack of adequately trained personnel, which may affect both planning and emergency management. For example, the lack of knowledge regarding the use of medical and healthcare devices to support vulnerable individuals could undermine the effectiveness of intervention in an emergency.
	<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Strengthening dialogue between local health authorities (ASL) and Civil Protection to create and update the mapping of vulnerable people. ● The mapping process offers a valuable opportunity to activate structured communication channels and regular exchanges between institutions involved in preparedness and response. ● Creating a shared space for discussion with associations at different levels. Various community organisations, volunteer groups, experts from specific sectors (e.g., animal farming) and civil society actors can contribute relevant knowledge and experience, enriching the understanding of local needs. ● Use different communication tools to reach different target groups (e.g. WhatsApp). ● Leveraging existing coordination structures, such as the Provincial Operations Centre (CoP: Centro Operativo Provinciale).
<p>Step 2: Identification and collection of feedback and lessons learnt.</p>	<p>Stakeholders</p> <p>Involving local associations such as “Io Non Crollo”. Organisations like Io Non Crollo can be recognised as important actors in the engagement process. Their local knowledge, community trust, and ongoing presence make them valuable partners for outreach, feedback collection, and awareness-raising activities.</p> <p>Barriers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Incomplete understanding of the initiative and of the CLIPP procedure: communication should be clear and involve the entire



local community, including elderly people. Incomplete understanding of the initiative may also reduce active participation.

- Limited time and resources: Engaging citizens and collecting feedback requires dedicated staff, coordination, and follow-up, which are often constrained by workload and budget limitations.
- Privacy concerns and lack of trust: Privacy limits for including collected information in the Emergency Plan. Some residents may react negatively to being added to group chats or mailing lists, as they worry about data misuse or simply do not trust institutional communication channels. Misinformation and general distrust make people especially cautious.
- Loss of valuable feedback contributors who left the area: Many individuals evacuated, boarded buses, and never returned. Yet these are often the people whose feedback would be most valuable, as they can explain what did not work for them and why they felt it was not worth staying to rebuild.
- Youth disengagement: People aged from 15 to 30y/o are largely absent from Civil Protection events, do not participate in preparedness activities, and rarely express their perspectives. This creates a generational gap in involvement and in understanding local risks and needs and would be difficult to include their feedback as well in the discourse.
- Need for different, more specific and effective communication tools and channels for certain groups (e.g. elderly people)
- Facilitation: Choosing unsuitable days or times may reduce community participation; Excessive use of digital tools during meetings; Communication that is too technical or uses specialist terms/anglicisms; The facilitators' skills can affect active participation during activities; Need for tools and methods that encourage participation.
- Risk of lack of objectivity in people who have experienced disaster events (citizens or administrators).

Opportunities

- Transforming preparedness plans into something concrete and citizen-centred: Integrating the citizens' point of view makes preparedness plans not only technical documents but tools rooted in real experiences, needs, and perceptions of the community.
- Leveraging the role of volunteers as both communicators and collectors of information: Volunteers already share information with the public and gather feedback during well-established national events such as "Io Non Rischio in Piazza". These activities can be



	<p>carried out not only in October but throughout the year, creating continuous engagement opportunities with citizens.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Using schools and children as effective communication channels: Initiatives like “Io Non Rischio a Scuola” actively involve children, who often become valuable intermediaries for reaching parents. Even when it is difficult to collect feedback directly from adults, children can help convey key messages and encourage family-level discussion.● Greater involvement makes citizens more informed and aware. Increase knowledge about how to act in an emergency.● Using field visits both as an opportunity for risk communication and to gather feedback. Field visits can serve not only for data collection but also as a practical way to inform residents about local risks. This method is especially valuable for reaching population groups that are otherwise hard to engage, including vulnerable individuals who may not participate in public events or digital initiatives.● Possibility to identify potential volunteers, people or groups to activate and involve in case of emergency.● Cluster citizens participants based on similar needs or challenges. This leads to richer, clearer, and more actionable feedback. Matching facilitators with the targeted audience. Using peers as facilitators improves trust and participation: young people are more likely to engage with young facilitators, minorities with facilitators from their own communities, and so on.
Step 3: Filtering and aggregation of lessons learnt	Barriers <ul style="list-style-type: none">● How to prioritise feedback? It is unclear whether prioritisation should be thematic or based on target groups. Feedback coming from vulnerable groups (e.g., elderly people, persons with disabilities, families with many children) may need to get votes that carry more weight, but establishing fair and consistent criteria is challenging.● Risk of overlooking certain groups. When prioritising large volumes of feedback, there is a concrete risk of unintentionally neglecting specific categories of citizens, especially those who are less visible or harder to reach.● Lack of transparency in decision-making. If the criteria for prioritisation are not clearly communicated upfront, people may feel that their feedback is undervalued. This can seriously undermine long-term engagement: individuals who believe they were not listened to are unlikely to return and contribute again in the future.● “Administrative” difficulties in selecting feedback that expresses the same idea.



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A need that comes from only a few observations does not mean it is not important. ● Over-simplification risk: the analysis could simplify the results too much, ignoring relevant but specific/individual problems during emergencies. ● Too many observations may slow and block the process. <p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● TRIAGE: define objective criteria to assign priority to suggestions (a possible solution to ensure impartiality in technical analysis). ● Enriching Civil Protection plans with focused insights on vulnerable populations. Giving appropriate weight to feedback from fragile groups allows preparedness plans to better reflect real needs and social inequalities, resulting in more inclusive and effective strategies. ● Deepening the analysis through insights gathered in previous steps. The information collected during Steps 1 and 2 provides a broader context, helping to interpret feedback more accurately and design more robust prioritisation criteria. ● Possibility to exchange ideas and tools with other municipalities.
<p>Step 4: Revision of preparedness plans</p>	<p>Barriers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Risk of the entire process stopping due to lack of funding. Without financial support, the work done in previous steps may not translate into concrete actions, reducing the credibility of the process and discouraging both institutions and citizens from further engagement. Implementing improvements often requires investments in personnel, infrastructure, and equipment. ● Need to make the Emergency Plan easy to update and integrate. ● Lack of knowledge of the Plan and its updates among stakeholders, especially operational staff. ● Some vulnerabilities emerge only during emergencies: real-time updates would be needed to guide operations during the emergencies. <p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A much broader knowledge base to inform future planning. The analysis generated through the previous steps provides a richer and more comprehensive foundation for decision-making, improving overall efficiency and readiness for future emergencies. ● A stronger relationship between citizens and Civil Protection. By integrating citizen input into the implementation phase, Civil



	<p>Protection builds trust and connection with the community. This leads to more practical, inclusive, and widely supported preparedness plans.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Clarify roles and responsibilities during emergencies (“who does what”).● Enrich the Plan with annexes (e.g. vulnerability and pets mapping). It’s important to keep it constantly updated (e.g. mapping of disabilities and specific needs).
Step 5: Provision of feedback and further involvement of citizens	<p>Barriers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Relying only on word-of-mouth communication or very large assemblies. Using word of mouth as the main communication channel is unreliable and can distort information. Likewise, large public meetings make it difficult for participants to express themselves, discourage vulnerable groups from speaking, and result in low-quality feedback.● Some communication tools may exclude certain groups (e.g. elderly people).● It could create expectations among citizens, but the analysis of the results takes time.● The choice to integrate only some suggestions into the Plan could reduce future participation. <p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Using small, targeted groups instead of large assemblies. Working with smaller groups allows for more meaningful discussions, more frequent feedback cycles, and the possibility to cluster participants based on similar needs or challenges. This leads to richer, clearer, and more actionable insights.● Organising activities directly in neighbourhoods and familiar community spaces. Engagement is more effective when meetings take place in local areas—such as villages, neighbourhoods, or informal gathering points—rather than in central or institutional venues. People feel more at ease and more inclined to share their perspectives.● Matching communicators with the target audience. Using peers as facilitators improves trust and participation: young people are more likely to engage with young facilitators, minorities with facilitators from their own communities, and so on. This also strengthens the quality of “feedback return”, making explanations—such as why



	<p>certain suggestions were not prioritised—more understandable and less hierarchical.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Use of social media as communication tools (Not exclusively and not as a replacement for other tools). Feedback can also be provided using non-digital tools, simpler and more accessible for everyone.● Greater attention to language (with particular attention to the use of technical terminology).● Show that the administration cares about preparedness. Show transparency and clarity from the administration.● The Plan can be published and shared with the population.
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